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TECHNICAL PAPER
RAC-TP-305

MAY 1968

**RESEARCH
ANALYSIS
CORPORATION**

**Viet Cong Control
in the Saigon-Gia Dinh
Special Zone (U)**

JUL 12 1968

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UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE DEPARTMENT
TECHNICAL PAPER RAC-TP-305
Published May 1968

Viet Cong Control in the Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone (U)

by
B. J. Smith

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FOREWORD

(U) The exploratory Institutional Research study from which this report derives had its origins in RAC's earlier research on urban insurgency. The report is based almost exclusively on data from Viet Cong sources and seeks a level of detail that may be useful in subsequent work on the subject. The study is concerned with the mechanics of insurgent control in a specified area of South Vietnam before the insurgency became a war.

(U) As is the case with its companion piece on proselyting, it is hoped that this study furnishes an example of what can be synthesized from raw intelligence already in the files of the United States government.

George A. Martinez

Head, Unconventional Warfare Department

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

(U) The author is indebted to many persons for their assistance in the collection of data for this study. Chief among these were the patient and cooperative officers who staff the Combined Military Intelligence Center and the Combined Document Exploitation Center in Saigon. In the preparation of the report itself, recognition is due Dr. H. Russell Fogler of RAC for his description of the computer program found in Appendix A.

(U) If any one person is to be singled out for thanks in connection with this study it is Miss Mary C. Davidson of RAC, who has patiently and efficiently tabulated data and kept the files from chaos while at the same time contributing substantially to this report.

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Problem

(U) To describe the growth of the control apparatus in the urban area of South Vietnam referred to by the Viet Cong (VC) as the Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone and to demonstrate the breadth of the data base furnished by pertinent raw-intelligence reports available in allied government files.

Facts

(U) Control of VC operations in the urban area encircling the city of Saigon for a 30-mile radius is vested in the Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone Committee. A great deal of data from raw-intelligence reports is available for an analysis of the growth of this committee. These raw-intelligence documents consist of reports on the interrogation of captured and defected VC personnel, captured documents, and agent reports. English translations of reports that deal with the period before 1965 are few and retrieval of the reports from the files of allied governments is difficult.

(U) The disproportionately high population density in the Special Zone and the concentration of Republic of Vietnam (RVN) governmental power in the city of Saigon make the area a prime target for insurgent activity. Reconstruction of insurgent activity in the area is, however, rendered difficult by VC security practices.

Discussion

(U) VC strategy in South Vietnam is implemented on three fronts: the political, the military, and the popular. This paper deals with the action on the first two fronts, the third having been dealt with in an earlier study.¹

(U) The Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone Committee exercises control of VC operations through a Standing Group and several staff sections with the chain of command leading to committees of similar structure at the rural-district and city-borough level. The same pattern of organization is reflected on a smaller scale at village and hamlet level. Since the signing of the Geneva Accords in July 1954 the VC, guided by the Communist government in North Vietnam, have been training the cadre and adapting Viet Minh assets to build up the organization.

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SUMMARY

(C) In addition to the proselyting apparatus, which is designed to subvert the South Vietnamese people,¹ the Special Zone Committee exercises control through its staff elements in seven primary fields of endeavor. These fields include VC military affairs, propaganda, Communist Party organization, security and intelligence, courier and liaison services, and financial and economic survival. Although before mid-1965 the number of people involved in the control organization was small, the results have been impressive and an analysis of the techniques might prove useful in anticipating similar events in other areas at future dates.

Conclusions

(U) 1. The sizable data base pertinent to the VC apparatus, represented by information already in the files of the international intelligence community, is adequate for a detailed analysis of the evolution of this apparatus.

(U) 2. The sampling of data reported in this study indicates a need for access to information concerning the time period before 1965.

(U) 3. Studies of the type represented by this report may have practical application of a predictive and methodological nature and make possible the establishment of computerized data banks for use in the current Vietnam conflict.

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**Viet Cong Control
in the Saigon-Gia Dinh
Special Zone**

ABBREVIATIONS

DRVN	Democratic Republic of Vietnam
EDP	electronic data processing
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
NFLSVN	National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
USAID	US Agency for International Development
VC	Viet Cong

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

INITIAL OBJECTIVES

(U) This project was initiated with three objectives in mind.

(U) First, it was hypothesized that if one knew everything there is to know about the evolution of an insurgent apparatus in an actual urban environment he might be in a better position to anticipate and thwart the evolution of another insurgent apparatus in another urban environment. Patently, the best way to acquire a comprehensive grasp of "everything there is to know" is actual participation, preferably at a high level, in the evolving events. Failing this opportunity, the second-best sources of such knowledge are the experiences and papers of those who did participate in these events.

(U) The second objective was to attempt to systematize and optimize the use of intelligence reports that have outlived their operational utility, thus demonstrating that a timely bit of sifting through the intelligence community's wastebaskets could produce a timely understanding of the problems the US faces today—an understanding that would contribute to the attainment of the first objective.

(U) The third objective—if indeed it is an objective rather than simply a useful by-product—was to produce concise, detailed accretions of fact, such as tables, gazetteers, registers, and data banks, that could be used by other researchers and students of urban insurgency.

RESEARCH LIMITATIONS

(U) To attain the first objective it was necessary to choose a contemporary urban insurgent apparatus as the focus of data collection. It was difficult to avoid the Vietnamese conflict as the area from which to choose, and the most important urban environment in Vietnam is obviously the area surrounding the municipality of Saigon. Conveniently enough, the insurgents themselves had chosen to call this area the Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone. The word "special" in the title indicates that the subject is worthy of detailed study.

(U) In this connection, moreover, the selection of the Vietnamese arena for study was influenced by the availability of raw data. Literally tons of paper

covered with opinion and fact are available in Vietnam and in Washington. The problem of winnowing out the kernels of fact is a very large one indeed, because the exploratory nature of this study precludes extensive use of automatic data processing.

(U) As a result of a substantial reduction in the level of effort that RAC was able to allot to this project this study falls far short of relating all there is to know about the evolution of the VC apparatus in the Special Zone. It does, however, pull together and place in context a sketch of that evolutionary process during the decade of the sixties. Insofar as the third objective is concerned the description of RAC's biographical or personality data bank is reported in App A and the Cover Designation Registry is outlined in App B.

(U) The limited purpose of this paper, then, is to reconstruct some aspects of the beginnings of the VC insurgency. As the title indicates, the paper deals with a specific segment of the insurgent infrastructure in South Vietnam: the VC administrative subdivision that controls the Communist apparatus in and around the city of Saigon. Although the land area involved is scarcely larger than that controlled by a tertiary VC administrative subdivision, this one is accorded the status of a "region," or primary subdivision. This special position is understandable on demographic grounds alone, for about an eighth of the entire population of South Vietnam lives in the area. In addition it is significant that Saigon, a city five times as big as the other three separate municipalities in the south combined, shelters the headquarters of the armed forces and is the seat of the incumbent government that the insurgents seek to displace.

SCOPE

(U) This paper describes how the VC organization in the Special Zone evolved from the Viet Minh stay-behind cadre that remained underground in and around Saigon when the country was partitioned in 1954. For the most part, data that would contribute to a description of activities before 1960 are difficult to come by. It is very natural that our national interests lie in current operational information that will enable the allied forces in Vietnam to prosecute the war more effectively. As a result, information of a historical nature is accorded a low priority to make room for current intelligence that is useful for operational purposes. Consequently, the time frame within which this paper describes the evolution of a small portion of the VC apparatus is limited almost entirely to the present decade. In view of the fact, however, that the apparatus was relatively quiescent between 1954, when the Geneva Accords split Vietnam, and 1960, it is believed that the paper does deal with the critical evolutionary period.

(U) This study does not attempt to examine the subject of VC military operations. Many men and machines in Vietnam, Washington, and elsewhere are devoted to that subject and RAC can contribute little in the small-scale effort involved here.

(U) The subject of the VC proselyting program is discussed in a separate paper.¹

DATA COLLECTION

(U) The data collection for this study was confined largely to raw information from VC sources. As the reference section indicates, the products of the interrogation centers and of the Document Exploitation Center in Saigon provide the bulk of the data used. In interviews with knowledgeable Vietnamese, former VC, Frenchmen, and Americans, requests for anonymity have been respected.

(U) Only in the area of biographic information has RAC been able to program data manipulation for this study and for the future use of the research community. A brief description of the program and a short biographical register are included in the appendixes to this paper. A logical extension of the work done for this study, and one that the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) is working toward, would be to evolve programs from all the data pertaining to agency cover designations, geographical locations, and the like for electronic data processing (EDP). Initially, at least, the data collection did not lend itself to computerization; each scrap of pertinent information has been culled from hundreds of captured documents and interrogation reports, carded under a subject heading, and compared with other scraps of information. The entire process has relied on human judgment, detective work, and the selection of certain key interrelations for further study.

Data Shortcomings

(U) As noted, the raw data for this study are derived primarily from VC sources. Interrogation reports and captured documents provide the bulk of the material. Unfortunately, all this material has been translated into English by human beings, who often interpret and embellish, and therein lies a basic impurity in the data, for humans do not consistently choose the same word to express the same idea. One man's battalion may be another man's company, especially when there exists no exact English word to express the Vietnamese. It must also be taken into account that the interrogations of VC prisoners and defectors were conducted by men of varying skills. A successful interrogator must ask the right questions and must have the knack of drawing his subject out; otherwise the results are often superficial. In order to ask the right questions, the interrogator must have intimate knowledge of the topics with which his subject may be familiar; he must be able to catch his subject in a lie; and he must remember what other subjects have said on the topic. In short, a really skillful interrogator is the product of long experience and hard work. A third weakness in these data arises from the fact that before 1965 they have in large measure been furnished to American authorities by the Vietnamese. It is a very human practice to withhold, even from one's friends, that which is derogatory to oneself. It is fairly safe to assume that some of the data on which this study is based have been filtered by Vietnamese authorities.

(U) Despite flaws in the data deriving from these three sources—translation, expertness of the interrogator, and political filtering—a vast amount of authentic detail remains on how the VC worked and how their organization evolved in the Special Zone. In the final analysis these data are, after all,

derived from firsthand knowledge of the VC modus operandi. If they have suffered in their initial processing much remains that is authentic.

Collection Phases

(U) The data were collected in two phases. First, several months were spent in Washington to screen some 100 rolls of microfilmed documents from the files of the J2 of the USMACV. Pertinent documents were printed out and culled for detail on the evolution of the VC Special Zone Committee; this detail was then carded and filed alphabetically by subject. Meanwhile, familiarity with the subject increased sufficiently to permit interviews of knowledgeable people in the US who were able to suggest other data sources.

(U) Most of these interviews suggested that much additional valuable information could be found in the archives of the French, British, and Vietnamese governments and in the files of the MACV. Accordingly, in the second phase a field trip was planned in the course of which the author was to visit various contacts in the countries concerned. Unfortunately the field trip was limited to Vietnam, where the volume of data and the problem of retrieval in the time available proved of such magnitude as to preclude visits to the French and British.

Data Sources

(U) The following paragraphs outline the procedure used for data collection in Vietnam and indicate some of the problems that the researcher must solve if he is to acquire a well-rounded base of raw data for his subsequent analyses. First, within the Vietnamese-American military structure in the vicinity of Saigon two primary agencies concern themselves with raw data: the Combined Military Interrogation Center and the Combined Document Exploitation Center. Both are manned by military personnel of the two countries and perform little analytical work. Both are under the combined control of the military intelligence agencies of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff and the MACV.

(U) The Interrogation Center extracts intelligence information from VC prisoners and defectors, publishes detailed reports of the results of interrogations, and responds to requirements for specific information. In general, the VC who are interrogated there have been screened in the field and found to have information that might be of interest and assistance in current military operations.

(U) The Document Exploitation Center is responsible for translating captured VC papers. Its volume of work is such that the Center makes no attempt to translate everything that falls into its hands; rather, it screens documents for content and publishes briefs in periodic bulletins. Papers of operational significance are given priority for full translation. The Document Exploitation Center also responds to specific requests for full translations.

(U) The central repository in Vietnam for the products of these two agencies is the Combined Intelligence Center. The processes of collation and storage are performed here and raw intelligence from nearly every collector can be found.

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(U) The major problem encountered by the researcher at any level in the military intelligence community stems from the fact that the military must place primary emphasis on the collection and production of information that will best contribute to the successful conduct of current military operations. Information of historical significance must be given lower priority for translation and reporting. As a consequence, the Interrogation Center emphasizes questions of an immediate nature. Similarly the Document Center concentrates on the translation of papers that contribute to the field commanders' requirement for timely information on the enemy. The backlog of untranslated documents of historical interest will some day furnish full-time employment for those who would seek to reconstruct the events that led to the current war in Vietnam.

(U) Closely allied to these military facilities are the National Interrogation Center, the Combined Intelligence Staff, the Combined Security Committee, and several agencies of the Vietnamese National Police.

(C) The National Interrogation Center is charged with extracting political and strategic information from detainees, many of whom have been interrogated by the military or the police and found to have knowledge of broad significance. The National Interrogation Center publishes and distributes reports that are collated with other intelligence received at the Combined Intelligence Center and elsewhere.

(C) The Combined Intelligence Staff and Combined Security Committee were established in late 1966 to monitor subversive insurgent activity in the Special Zone. Their close connection with the military and the police facilitate the launching of timely counteractions in the area. The Security Committee's reports are a valuable addition to the base of raw data available on the Special Zone, particularly insofar as the activities of key VC personalities are concerned.

(C) The Vietnamese National Police furnish a valuable source of raw data in that they too conduct interrogations of suspects and, in the Special Branch particularly, have useful covert contacts who are able to acquire information on insurgent activities.

(C) Perhaps the largest stumbling block encountered by the data collector in his attempt to secure information from Vietnamese sources is the lack of a retrieval system. Doubtless the military and police files of the RVN are replete with reports that would contribute substantially to papers such as this one, if only there were a means for locating the pertinent reports. Here again is the basis for full-time employment for a team of linguists and data processors.

(U) To summarize, ample data exist in Vietnam and elsewhere for the detailed reconstruction of how the VC apparatus evolved into its present form. Information pertaining to past events receives little attention in the midst of an active war and is difficult to retrieve. It is really only in the last few years that the funds and the personnel have been available to the MACV to systematize data storage. It will probably be a long time before the backlog can be processed. The information that reposes in the files of the Vietnamese government can be retrieved, at the moment, only by reading vast amounts of material, all in the Vietnamese language. The obvious result is that there exists a reasonably manipulable base of English-language data covering the activities of the VC in recent years but very little of significance before the beginning of the current decade.

TERMINOLOGY

(U) The following pages contain a few VC terms and usages with which the reader may not be familiar and other terms that have been invented in an effort to communicate ideas more accurately. Because the raw data used in this study are in the form of English translations from the Vietnamese, it has been necessary to interpret what the translator meant by his choice of words. The interpretation may, in some cases, fail to reflect what was originally said; however, the translator's choice of words in those instances makes necessary an arbitrary decision on the real meaning.

(U) Cadre. Frequent use is made of the term "cadre." The word is used to refer to an individual member of a cadre—the hard-core personnel of a revolutionary organization—as well as in its collective sense. The noun is used to distinguish a leader, one of the hard core, from a neophyte or trainee. The cadres of a VC organization are the elite; the cadre of a VC organization is the framework of hard-core members; the word is used in both contexts. Not all cadres are Communist Party members, however.

(U) Current Affairs. Charts of VC organizations at practically any level include a box labeled "Current Affairs" section, committee, or office. It is believed that this term could be more accurately translated as "standing" group or committee: that full-time body which oversees the conduct of affairs when the principals are not in session; the professional executive group that carries out the policies set by the board of directors. Insofar as is practicable, the term "standing" will be used in this study in lieu of "current affairs."

(U) Place names. Vietnamese place names have a variety of spellings and prefixes. Every effort has been made in this study to use the names found in the "Index to Names on 1:50,000 Maps of Vietnam" published by the Army Map Service.² The Vietnamese practice of prefixing place names, in some instances, with An, Ap, Xom, and so on is confusing to the foreigner. To complicate matters further, the VC do not always use the same place names as do the South Vietnamese. The Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam is producing a seven-volume gazetteer to 100 captured VC-North Vietnamese Army map sheets in the scale of 1:100,000, which will relate VC to RVN place names.³ At the time of writing, Vols V and VI, which cover the Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone, were not available. Their publication should be very helpful in any research project requiring the use of maps of this area.

(U) A sketch map is provided in App C to enable the reader to locate the place names used in this paper. Place names are arranged alphabetically and each is assigned a number that appears on the map in approximately the correct location.

(U) Pseudonyms. As a security precaution, the VC seldom use their real names either in documents or in conversation. Nearly everyone uses a pseudonym, which is usually made up of a number followed by a common name. In some instances this name derives from the person's real one; in others it is pure invention. Many persons have several pseudonyms: one for organizational use, one for Communist Party use, and still others for special purposes. Some persons change their pseudonyms periodically. For example, Dinh Cong Det is also known as "Dinh Hung" or "Phan Dan"; Nguyen Van Nghia is called

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"Tam (eight) Nghia"; and the young female courier, Mai Thi Vang, calls herself "Ba (three) Cao." It is hoped that the program described in App A will, when refined, prove useful in relating pseudonyms to real names in the Special Zone apparatus.

(C) Alphanumeric Designations. The last note of explanation concerns another VC security measure, that of assigning to each of its agencies an alphanumeric designation. Some of these cover designations are changed from time to time; in the Special Zone they were apparently last altered in December 1965.⁴ The MACV is working on an EDP system for storage of information pertaining to these cover designations and the so-called "letter box numbers" assigned to each organization. The numbers are very useful clues in associating organizations with their subordinate apparatus and the reverse. Examples of this system are the Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone Committee, which was designated I.4 before 1963 and T.4 since then; the staff sections of this committee, which as of June 1965 were designated serially from Y.60 through Y.80; and as an exception, the Central Office, South Vietnam, which is known simply as R. A more complete listing of these designations can be found in App B.

Chapter 2

ORGANIZATION FOR CONTROL

BACKGROUND

(U) As is thoroughly elaborated in the history books, the Vietnamese Communist power being demonstrated in the war today is the direct outgrowth of a nationalistic spirit. The spirit first began to manifest itself, perhaps, in the year 39 when the Trung sisters led a successful revolt against Chinese domination, or in the seventh century when the Tang dynasty granted the newly named protectorate of Annam a degree of national unity. In any event the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905 inspired nationalistic optimism among many French-educated Vietnamese, who saw proof in this victory of the ability of an Asian nation to assert its nationalism in opposition to a European power.

(U) From 1905 until 1930 several attempts were made by Vietnamese intellectuals to consolidate nationalist sentiment and to establish a constitutional government to replace French rule in Indochina. These attempts were climaxed in 1930 with a revolt staged by the Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (Vietnamese Nationalist Party) at Yen Bay, northwest of Hanoi. The French crushed this revolt and the near-dissolution of the Nationalist Party resulted. Into this vacuum slipped the newly formed Indochinese Communist Party. The leader of the party, Nguyen Ai Quoc, was then able to unite several independent Communist cliques and establish control over the clandestine nationalist movement in Vietnam. By 1942 French colonialism and the Japanese occupation of Vietnam had driven many of the nationalist groups in exile into a coalition with the Communists called the Viet Nam Doc-Lap Dong Minh Hoi (Vietnam Independence League), which became popularly known as the "Viet Minh." Meanwhile, the Chinese, in an ineffective effort to use the anti-Communist Vietnamese exiles to collect intelligence on Japanese activities in Vietnam, had been providing financial support to a nationalist group called Viet Nam Cach Minh Dong Minh Hoi. At this point, Nguyen Ai Quoc, who had been jailed by the Chinese for Communist activities, was released from prison in exchange for his promise to supply the necessary intelligence. He planned to use Viet Minh agents and guerrillas under the direction of the Communist Vo Nguyen Giap for this purpose. Using the pseudonym "Ho Chi Minh," Nguyen Ai Quoc proceeded to establish Communist cells throughout Vietnam and to achieve

control of the Viet Minh using money furnished by the Chinese and Americans in payment for intelligence on the Japanese.

(U) By the end of World War II the Communist Ho Chi Minh and his nationalist-flavored Viet Minh represented, in the eyes of all but a few astute observers, the only hope of the Vietnamese elite for true national independence. With the people's support and the opportunity provided by the abdication of Vietnamese Emperor Bao Dai, who looked only at the nationalist face of the Viet Minh, Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the formation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN). The return of French colonial rule to Vietnam in late 1945 served to jell Vietnamese nationalist antipathy. After an unsuccessful year of attempted negotiation with the French, the Viet Minh launched the 8-year war, which culminated in the division of the country, the departure of the French, and the carefully nurtured beginnings of a covert Communist machine in South Vietnam. Actual control of the DRVN came to rest in the hands of the Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam (the Workers Party of Vietnam); that is to say, the Communist Party of Vietnam. The "Lao Dong," as it was popularly called, was formed in 1951 when the Communists began to find the Viet Minh too unwieldy for their purposes; its membership represented the key Communist elements of the Viet Minh.

(U) Lao Dong subversive activities in that portion of Vietnam south of the Ben Hai River at lat 17° N were conducted through Vietnamese Communist agents, guerrillas, and soldiers, derisively known in the south since 1957 as "Viet Cong," and through the front organizations supported by the DRVN—invented Mat Tran Dan Toc Giai Phong, the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN). The VC started as the covert operational arm of Ho Chi Minh's campaign and the National Liberation Front as the overt "popular" manifestation, useful for foreign consumption, of Vietnamese desire for national unification—on Ho Chi Minh's terms.

(U) The organizations of the VC and the National Liberation Front were parallel and, at certain echelons, intertwined, as an examination of the roles of various leaders will reveal. Operational employment of the VC was directed by Hanoi's Central Office for South Vietnam located in Tay Ninh Province. Popular front organizations for youth, women, Buddhists, artists, writers, laborers, and a number of other social groupings were manipulated by the Communist Party through the National Liberation Front.

(U) In February 1962 the "Liberation Broadcasting Station" announced that the first congress of the NFLSVN had established a Central Committee of 52 members. At that first congress, 31 members were elected to the Central Committee, leaving 21 vacancies for new front organizations as they came into being. The chairman was a Saigon lawyer, named Nguyen Huu Tho, long active in the VC; one of the five vice chairmen named was a Saigon architect, Huynh Tan Phat, a leader of VC subversion in the Gia Dinh area.

(U) This study describes the evolution of the apparatus in that part of the RVN variously designated by the VC as "Military Region IV," the "Saigon-Gia Dinh Region," the "Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh Special Zone," and the "Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone." The last-named version and its shorter form, "Special Zone," are used in this study.

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


Fig. 1—The Special Zone in Government Terminology

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


Fig. 2—The Special Zone in Viet Cong Terminology

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ORIGINS OF THE SPECIAL ZONE


(C) As was the case throughout South Vietnam, the Viet Minh left a stay-behind organization in Gia Dinh Province and in the city of Saigon when they withdrew north of the 17th Parallel after the Geneva Agreements in July 1954. Apparently what had been the Viet Minh Gia Dinh Provincial Committee was to be held responsible for low-key propaganda operations and proselyting activities in the rural districts surrounding the city of Saigon. The Viet Minh Saigon-Cholon Committee was to control activities in the city itself, which was to be treated as a separate entity on an equal footing with the province. The cadre that remained in rural areas were instructed to blend with the villagers, to conduct their party activities in secret, and to use the jungle and underground passageways for the storage of their typewriters and printing equipment as well as for hideouts. In the city, where police control was tighter and a legitimate facade was essential to the party's existence, the stay-behind cadre allied itself with the intellectual leaders, particularly journalists, playwrights, and authors, to form an effective propaganda-producing machine for the Communists. This city control group was able to maintain its own publishing house until 1958 or 1959,⁵ when a series of government raids revealed its true purpose. The cadre who were caught in the government net were arrested and imprisoned.

(C) In 1960 Gia Dinh Province and the Saigon-Cholon area were merged to create an area of responsibility that embraced the Saigon-Cholon municipality and surrounding districts. Figure 1 depicts districts and provinces according to the boundaries and names used by the government of the RVN. The data indicate that the VC Special Zone boundaries include the city of Saigon-Cholon, all Gia Dinh Province, Cu Chi District of Hau Nghia Province, and Di An District of Bien Hoa Province. (Province and district boundary changes have created the new province of Hau Nghia, which includes a district called Cu Chi. Parts of what was formerly Cu Chi are now included in Phu Hoa District of Binh Duong Province. The VC do not appear to recognize the existence of Hau Nghia Province.) In February 1964, however, a VC overlay⁶ was captured that, if accurate, would indicate the changes shown in Fig. 2. Figure 2 shows the boundaries and names of the provinces and districts according to VC usage as contrasted with RVN usage shown in Fig. 1.

(C) Thus after 6 years of clandestine efforts to strengthen the underground apparatus, the VC accorded the Saigon-Gia Dinh area a status equivalent to that of a region or primary subdivision. The Gia Dinh Province Committee and the Saigon-Cholon Committee were merged and their personnel and equipment assigned to the various echelons of the new Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone Committee. The new headquarters became one of five major administrative echelons reporting to the VC Central Office for South Vietnam, which before 1960 had been known as the South Vietnam Party Committee.⁷ The overall organization probably resembled the one shown in Fig. 3. Although provisions were made for a full staff at each level, the data indicate that some functions were nominal and that others were fulfilled by the same people.⁸ In any event, it is clear that groups of dedicated VC who had been trained in Communist philosophy and technique were regularly infiltrating South Vietnam from the

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north, where some of them had been in residence since 1954. These persons provided the cadres required to staff the Communist organization for control in the south. As time went on the strength and skill of the Central Office and regional staffs increased steadily as a result of the infiltration and proselyting among the citizens of the RVN.



(C) Fig. 3—Viet Cong Organization in South Vietnam, 1960

ORGANIZATION IN THE SPECIAL ZONE

(U) Subsequent chapters discuss the Special Zone staff sections in some detail. It might be well at this point to look at the Special Zone Committee as a whole. The organization, at least on paper, of district and village control elements subordinate to the Special Zone Committee followed the pattern set by the Central Office and the Special Zone. It is clear that many of the cadre

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members performed in more than one capacity and that some of the elements with resounding titles and vast responsibilities were manned by only a few people. Personalities are not discussed here; App A provides a consolidated listing of key personnel and a few biographical notes.

(C) The structure of the Special Zone Committee when it was first organized in 1960 is not entirely clear from the data available. There is ample evidence that, from the outset, control in the rural areas was maintained as a function quite separate from that in Saigon. It is safe to say that, probably by 1962, the Special Zone was organized into three major subdivisions^{5,9,10} as shown in Fig. 4. Each of these subdivisions was considered to be in the province echelon and each of the eight boroughs* of the city of Saigon, as well as the rural districts themselves, in the district echelon. Organization at village level was built on the traditional Communist cellular system. In the city the borough committees organized the existing administrative subdivisions, 5 or 6 street groupings in each borough and 40-odd house clusters to a street grouping, in the same fashion.

(C) It will be noted from Fig. 4 and from a comparison of the sketch maps shown in Figs. 1 and 2 that, at some early stage of its existence, the Special Zone Committee chose to combine two of the western districts of Gia Dinh Province (Tan Binh and Binh Chanh) into a single district that the VC call "Binh Tan." Similarly, in the spring of 1962, two of the northern districts (Go Vap and Hoc Mon) were combined into the VC district of Go Mon.

(C) The titles of the Special Zone staff sections in 1962 corresponded generally to those of the Central Office shown in Fig. 3. The designated staff offices for proselyting, propaganda, party organization, financial, security, communications and transport, and military matters were coordinated by the standing committee served by its administrative secretariat. It is, again, unlikely that each of these sections was fully manned, for there is conclusive evidence that many of the key people in the Special Zone Committee carried several titles.

(C) As cells were expanded at village level in the rural areas, village committees added to the hierarchy. Three party members constituted a chapter in the village and, as membership grew, the chapter's organization chart came more and more to mirror that of the district committee. One source reports that chapters whose membership numbered fewer than nine were headed by a party chapter secretary and an assistant; 9 to 14 members rated a secretary and a two-man committee; when membership exceeded 15, the village committee was composed of a secretary, an assistant secretary, a standing committee member, and two or more committee members, depending on the size of the village chapter. Party solidarity and sound Communist orientation were maintained within the hierarchy by the requirements that a village committee secretary must have been a registered member of the Lao Dong† for at least 1 year, a district committee secretary for at least 3 years, and any provincial

*At the time, Saigon was divided into eight administrative districts that coincided with the police precincts. The author has chosen to use the term "boroughs" to avoid confusion with rural districts.

†In 1962 the Southern branch of the Lao Dong began calling itself Dang Nhan Dan Cach Mang (People's Revolutionary Party), a change in name only.

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


Fig. 4—Probable Organization of the Special Zone, 1962

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committee member for at least 5 years.¹¹ Additional economy of cadre was effected by reducing the number of first-echelon committees within the city of Saigon. The boroughs were paired off so that the equivalent of a district committee was in charge of two adjacent boroughs, i.e., Boroughs I and III, II and IV, V and VI, and VII and VIII. Figure 5 explains the grouping of boroughs in geographical terms.

(U) The next reorganization of the Special Zone apparently occurred in the spring of 1964. The data indicate that the VC leadership felt that the density and nature of the population in the Special Zone warranted a direct line to the committee for each district and borough. It is also probable that the shortage of Hanoi-trained top-level cadre argued in favor of the elimination of the intervening echelons represented by the Capital City Committee and the North and South province committees. The resultant organization must have resembled the one shown in Fig. 6.


(C) Since spring 1964, little basic change has occurred in the VC organization for control of the Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone. Many different versions of the titles carried by various staff sections of the Special Zone Committee, as well as conflicting testimony on many other points, are expected in these sorts of data. Insofar as these data permit, the following sections discuss the course of evolution in each of the elements of the Special Zone structure shown in Fig. 7. This diagram represents a reasonably accurate picture of the control mechanism at the end of 1965. As noted previously, troop units and the proselyting machinery in the Special Zone are not discussed in this study. Because of the dearth of information, the staff element called the civil health section, cited in one captured document¹² as subordinate to the Military Affairs Committee and in another¹³ as directly subordinate to the Special Zone Committee itself, does not warrant discussion.

Standing Group

(U) As noted in the Introduction, what many translators refer to as the "Current Affairs" Section of the Special Zone Committee is in fact a standing group of committee members who supervise the day-to-day conduct of affairs within the VC control apparatus. Use of the term "Standing Group" has some support from the translators of the original data in that some of them use the term "Standing Committee" for the same element that others call the "Current Affairs Committee."

(C) Over the years all the Special Zone Committee members, with the possible exception of the chairman and deputy chairman, have had other duties. In 1964, for example, of the 17 members and alternate members (four of them Standing Group) five were also chiefs of staff sections, seven were chiefs of district-level committees, and two were members of staff sections. The remaining three were the chairman, the deputy chairman, and a man who was later placed in charge of one of the proselyting organizations.

(C) There appears to have been fair continuity among the personnel making up the Special Zone Committee from its inception until at least the end of 1965. The chairman took over in early 1962, or even before, and was still in that position in 1965. The deputy chairman and three other key committee members stayed with the chairman during that time. In 1963 the Central



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


Fig. 5—Boroughs of Saigon before 1966

--- Borough boundaries

— Boundaries of the municipality of Saigon

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


Fig. 6—Probable Organization of the Special Zone, Spring 1964

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


Fig. 7—Probable Structure of the Special Zone Committee, Late 1965

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Office assigned five new members to the committee and they too were still active in 1965. Generally speaking the Standing Group has consisted of the same four or five men during the same period.

(C) Like most of the key elements of the Special Zone apparatus, the committee and its Standing Group maintained a headquarters in a VC-controlled area in the vicinity of Xom Bung, Xom Goc Chang, Bao Cap, and Ho Bo in Cu Chi District about 30 miles northwest of Saigon (see App C), where it was able to carry out its business with minimum harassment from the Vietnamese police and armed forces. Until late 1965 occasional government raids, undertaken on the basis of information from prisoners or captured documents, merely caused the committee members in the area to hide underground or to shift to an alternate location already planned for that purpose. Here in the safe area the Standing Group supervised the activities of the various staff sections and base installations that supported operations throughout the Special Zone. As new recruits were trained and indoctrinated, they were equipped with the necessary forged identity papers and infiltrated into the city where they joined ranks with the elements already operating there. The leaders made frequent trips into the city to supervise activities and appear to have moved freely about the countryside to attend meetings called by the Central Office in Tay Ninh Province or to deal with problems that arose in the subordinate district committees.

(C) As a security precaution in their written communications the Standing Group has changed its cover or alphanumeric designation no less than seven times between 1962 and 1965. In addition, in June 1964 it began using the code name "Anh Cong" interchangeably with the alphanumerics. Appendix B sets forth these designations in more detail.

Secretariat

(C) The section of clerks, radio operators, and other support personnel that enabled the Standing Group to perform its daily functions is referred to in this paper as the Secretariat. As noted previously, the Secretariat included a highly specialized cell of three skilled forgers⁵ who produced very authentic-looking identity papers for use in shielding VC city operations from the Saigon police department's curiosity.

(C) The Secretariat was an integral part of the Standing Group, traveling with it wherever it went and using the same cover designations. Its chief⁶ from 1962 until at least well into 1965¹⁴ was a highly trained and respected Communist leader who was a full member of the Special Zone Committee during the entire period.

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Chapter 3

MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

STATUS

(U) This staff element is accorded the title of "Committee" in this paper in order to underscore its comparative size and importance among the other staff sections. Many translators who use the term "section" in connection with the other elements of the Special Zone staff also call this element a "committee" and its subordinate arms "sections."

(U) One hesitates in any attempt to sort out the military from the political and economic aspects of the VC apparatus in the Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone for, as is the case in any insurgent movement, the three are intimately entangled. Americans are fond of drawing neat organization charts on which are shown command lines, liaison lines, and tidy boxes that contain staff titles and the names of subordinate elements. This has been done in great profusion for the VC; one suspects that this enthusiasm for tidiness has resulted in an inaccurate depiction of relationships or their absences. There is ample evidence to indicate great organizational fluidity and the filling of two or more positions by many of the key cadre, at least in the Special Zone.

(U) Nevertheless the VC do draw organization charts and they do show boxes that hang by clear, firm lines from an item entitled, in a majority of instances, "Military Affairs Committee." This subcommittee of the Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone Committee is that arm of the apparatus that deals, in a staff capacity, with the conduct of the armed struggle in the Special Zone. It is equally evident from the same sources that the political leadership exercises more than just policy guidance over military matters.

ORIGINS

(C) Until 1961 the Special Zone Committee apparently had no formally organized military component. Matters affecting the armed struggle were handled by the committee itself or by the district military sections involved.⁶ One source reports the following:

In March 1961 the . . . Special Zone Executive Committee [Standing Group] appointed Tu Ho, one of its members, to head its Military Affairs Division. . . . A number of former Viet Minh then gathered in Loc Thuan secret base [see App C] and were assigned to various subordinate sections of the Military Affairs Division.

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In May 1961 . . . the Military Affairs Division had constructed a number of new thatch-roofed buildings, and had personnel consisting of about 10 cadre and a security squad.¹⁵

(C) During August 1961, some 250 persons known as the Phuong Dong infiltration team⁶ arrived at the Central Office, South Vietnam. These persons were apparently regroupees who had been in North Vietnam since 1954 and presumably were well trained and thoroughly indoctrinated in the organizational and cadre duties that they were expected to perform as part of the VC apparatus.

(C) Shortly after their arrival, the Central Office selected some 30 of the Phuong Dong team⁶ to augment the Military Affairs Division at Loc Thuan and establish a full Military Affairs Committee for the Special Zone. The 30 persons—20 officers with ranks ranging from lieutenant to major and 10 non-commissioned officers—were placed under the temporary leadership of a major^{6,16} who remained an important figure in the military committee structure at least until December 1964.¹⁷ During those years this major, with no variations in his name, is cited by several interrogees and in several captured documents as a key figure in a number of components of the Military Affairs Committee: member of the Military Committee,¹⁷ chief of the Political Section of the Military Affairs Committee,^{5,6,16,17} and chief of the Capital Unit.⁶ It is curious that the major, unlike many of his colleagues, used no other names in any of his assignments. The assumption is that, since the name no longer appeared after December 1964, he was either a casualty of the war or was sent out of the Special Zone on another assignment.

(C) The 30-man cadre for the Special Zone Military Affairs Committee waited in the area of Anh Thanh Village^{5,6,18,19} until December 1961, when a colonel⁴ arrived to replace the major as the permanent head of the Military Affairs Committee;^{6,16} he still held the assignment in November 1965.^{13,14}

ORGANIZATION


(U) The organization grew under the colonel's direction and its structure filled out from 1961 on. In this study, the titles of the subordinate elements of the Military Affairs Committee reflect a synthesis of the several versions presented by many different sources and the terms used are believed to reflect most accurately and consistently the true nature and function of each subordinate element.

(C) Basically the Military Affairs Committee seems to have been organized into three staff sections and two troop commands, as shown in Fig. 8. The Operations Section was responsible for terrain analysis, tactical planning, organization, equipment, training, and recruit activities. The Political Affairs Section was the Communist Party element charged with the guidance of military personnel in the fields of ideology and morality and with the development of sound party organizations within the military units in the Special Zone. The Rear Services Section, of course, was responsible for supervising the provision to military personnel of food, clothing, weapons, and medical care. The responsibilities of the two troop commands involved the tactical employment

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of forces both in the city and throughout the rural districts of the Special Zone. Succeeding paragraphs deal in more detail with the three staff sections of the Military Affairs Committee. As previously stated, the two very modest troop commands are not discussed here; however, strengths and dispositions of VC troops for 1964-1966 are set forth in a captured document.²⁰



(C) Fig. 8—Probable Organization of the Special Zone Military Affairs Committee, 1962-1965


Operations Section

(C) This section of the Military Affairs Committee apparently consisted of a small group of staff officers and several detachments, which varied in size. The detachments were responsible to the chief of the Operations Section for the supervision and conduct of matters pertaining to communications, mapping, recruits, intelligence, and combat readiness. The section was supported by an administrative detachment. Figure 9 shows the structure of the Operations Section; the following paragraphs elaborate on each of the boxes.

(C) Most sources agree that the chief of the Operations Section was assisted by at least four officers. Occasionally there are indications that more than one officer might be assigned to one or more of the duties performed by these assistants. In any event one assistant was charged with responsibility for visiting VC units as an observer and staff supervisor and with keeping the chief informed on the conduct of tactical operations. A second assistant was responsible for planning and reporting. The periodic reports and statistics that he presented to the chief were used to keep the Special Zone and Central Office staffs advised of the military situation in the area. A third assistant was the training officer. He made up the lesson plans and training programs for the military units in the Special Zone and furnished guidance on the employment of weapons in training, in accordance with directives emanating from the Central Office. The fourth assistant seems to have been responsible

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(C) Fig. 9—Probable Subdivisions of the Operations Section of the Special Zone Military Affairs Committee, 1962-1965

for assisting the district military committees in establishing and developing guerrilla militia forces to support VC military operations in the Special Zone.⁶

(C) The administrative detachment handled the mail, maintained the files, did the typing, kept the financial records, and was responsible for feeding the staff. A report of the interrogation of a VC officer who had served for several years as planning and reporting assistant and chief of the administrative detachment gives the following description of the detachment in 1963-1964:

[The detachment] . . . was composed of five persons: . . . [a] lieutenant, chief . . . and concurrently assistant for [plans]; . . . [a] cadre, squad leader assistant-level, secretary for receiving and safeguarding official documents; . . . [a] (female) typist; . . . [a] command post administrative manager; and [a] liaison agent.

[The detachment was equipped with] . . . one very old bicycle and one standard Remington typewriter [Vietnamese keyboard] in poor mechanical condition. Office supplies were supplied by the [Rear Services Section].

[The detachment maintained its headquarters] . . . in Mrs. Sau's house at 4th Hamlet (XT 682259) An Thanh Village, Ben Cat District, Binh Duong Province. . . . Mrs. Sau has two daughters. . . . The [detachment] had been quartered in this house for the last six months. In the house there was a hideout for her family and at the side of the house there was a hideout for the five cadres. There was a side tunnel which was connected to the backbone-shaped [sic] tunnel of the village. . . . The mouth of this tunnel was near the forest and about 150 meters from Mrs. Sau's house.⁶

(C) The signal detachment consisted of two elements: one for operating the equipment and one for encoding and decoding messages and documents. It is likely that only a small volume of message traffic was handled by the signal detachment and that most communications were transmitted by courier, as will be discussed later. Apparently the radio communications element depended on captured materiel for message transmission and what little equipment

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it had, at least before 1965, was in poor repair. This element was commanded by a junior officer and was staffed by two or three radio-telegraph operators and four or five men whose duties were to operate the hand generator, provide local security for the element, and run messages. The cryptographic element, consisting of three or four cipher clerks and a runner, was also commanded by a junior officer.

(C) The cartographic detachment consisted of three or four draftsmen who prepared maps and overlays for the use of the Military Affairs Committee. Map sheets were based on the French 1:100,000 Indochina series with VC place names and boundaries substituted; an example is shown in Fig. 10. "The maps were annotated using red on the VC liberated areas, green on rubber plantations, and yellow on the RVN controlled areas. RVN outposts and strategic hamlets were marked with red ballpoint pen. The annotations were based on information provided by the [intelligence detachment]." Most of the data indicate that the cartographic detachment, like the administrative detachment, was usually located in a villager's house in whatever area the Operations Section was occupying at the time.

(C) The village chapter committees (see Fig. 5) conducted the recruiting of Vietnamese youth, principally from among the laboring classes, for service in the VC ranks and completed all the necessary paper work, including biographies and letter orders for each recruit. The district committees would then organize all the recruits into a number of manageable groups and guide them to the Operations Section's Recruit Reception Center, located in the northernmost tip of Cu Chi District, in the vicinity of the area where the Special Zone headquarters were maintained. Initially, in 1960 and 1961, most of the recruiting was conducted in areas controlled by the VC where enthusiasm ran high for the insurgency. As the war ground on, enthusiasm fell off and recruiters spread their efforts into territory still under the control of the government. At some point, probably in 1963, the Special Zone Committee issued instructions to the effect that no recruits would be taken from VC-dominated areas but would be sought elsewhere, the theory being that the young people already under their watchful eye were needed for support of the VC who occupied the towns and jungles nearby. The Recruit Reception Center was responsible for processing, feeding, and clothing the new recruits as they arrived. In addition, recruits were carefully screened both for health and loyalty to the cause. The final responsibility of the Reception Center involved separating the recruits into three groups: those to be sent back to their districts for reasons of poor health or because they were suspected of being government agents, those who were to go to the Central Office as the Special Zone's quota, and those who were to be sent to the Recruit Training Center as replacements for the Saigon Task Force Command and the Rural Troop Command (see Fig. 8). In 1963 the Reception Center stopped sending sick or suspect personnel back to their districts and began to funnel all the healthy working-class recruits into the Training Center. The rest, those in poor health and those with higher education, were sent to the Central Office. This change in policy appears to have been bred of a need for more recruits plus a desire to achieve the optimum noncombat utilization of available personnel by sending the sick and well-educated to the Central Office.

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(C) Fig. 10—Viet Cong Map Showing a Portion of the Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone

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et Cong Map Showing a Portion of the Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone

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(C) The Recruit Training Center was responsible for teaching small-unit tactics and weapons handling to the new recruits in order that they might replenish the ranks of the Special Zone's troop commands. It appears that training was conducted by a cadre of 10, supervised by a captain and possibly a deputy who held the rank of lieutenant. Classes lasted for 2 months^{6,21} and were usually composed of somewhat less than 100 recruits.²¹ There is some evidence that the Recruit Training Center was operated in conjunction with a Military Political School, which, at one point before 1964, had been assigned the same cover number as the Center.^{19,22} Moreover, one source states that in February 1964 this school was training two platoons (70 men) of "draftees" from Gia Dinh Province in political and military subjects.²¹ It is safe to assume that the Recruit Training Center was almost as much concerned with the political indoctrination of recruits as it was with their military training, for the political officer of the Center, at least in 1962 and 1963, held a rank equivalent to that of the Center commander.⁶

(C) The data pertaining to the intelligence detachment of the Operations Section are at considerable variance. This fact is not surprising since any organization seeks to cloak its intelligence activities in as much mystery as possible. Therefore, the following discussion of the intelligence detachment is based on a very thin data sample and undoubtedly includes erroneous aspects of the organization that may have been deliberately planted by some of the VC sources. In addition, it is difficult to draw a line between military intelligence and political intelligence activities, particularly on a scale so small as that furnished by the Special Zone Committee. As previously remarked, the VC were numerically weak in the Special Zone; they were forced for years to work underground, both literally and figuratively, and to man their organization as best they could. Very probably the organization portrayed in the ensuing paragraphs includes bits and pieces of the Special Zone intelligence apparatus that do indeed exist as shown but that do not, in fact, come under the control of the Military Affairs Committee. This, in the final analysis, does not detract from the utility of attempting to reconstruct the evolution of military intelligence because the very fluidity of the VC organization probably caused the military apparatus to operate in the political arena with equal freedom.

(C) Most sources agree on the identity of the man who built up the military intelligence detachment from the time the Special Zone was created in 1960. Initially the detachment must have consisted of three or four men who were made responsible for building a military intelligence network using the assets available in the district committees. Most of their time was spent moving about the Special Zone on bicycles⁶ seeking to collate information from the district intelligence elements on the dispositions, strengths, and armaments of the government forces opposing the VC in their areas. Apparently this small cadre did its job well, at least in the eyes of one key figure: ". . . because of the tight military intelligence system of the District's Military Sections, the Military Intelligence assistants have been able to accomplish their work efficiently. They seemed to know every disposition and agency of the Republic of Vietnam."⁶ Gradually, as more personnel arrived from the north, the original cadre was augmented and the military intelligence apparatus of the Special Zone strengthened. About July 1962 the Central Office is reported to have assigned a large number of newly arrived personnel to the Special Zone

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Committee; the military intelligence detachment received a share of the new people and by early 1963 had been able to create an organization that must have resembled the one diagrammed in Fig. 11. At the head of the organization were its founder and probably one assistant who supervised the whole operation. The staff officers who remained in the office collated reports from field agencies to form, for the Military Affairs Committee, the coordinated reports required by the Special Zone Committee and probably the Central Office for South Vietnam. The field team probably consisted of several specialists who traveled throughout the Special Zone to give training in certain aspects of the military intelligence operation wherever it was needed. The three¹⁵ city-agent teams were furnished with forged identity papers and assigned to building up agent networks in the city; they probably worked closely with or even reinforced the efforts of the military and civil-servant proselyting teams in the Saigon-Cholon area. These city teams represented a major portion of the military intelligence detachment's effort in that they were assigned to penetrate government military installations by subverting susceptible personnel who worked in the various headquarters in Saigon. By 1964 each of these city-agent teams probably consisted of 8 to 10 operators. Each team was assigned a rendezvous area, usually in the northern part of Cu Chi District, where instructions were issued by representatives of the military intelligence detachment. Each agent was taught the classical Communist concept of cellular organization and compartmentalization in order that the agent net in the city might maintain the maximum degree of security.

(C) Agents were categorized as collectors of information, intermediaries or cutouts, and penetration agents. The last-named were theoretically the most valuable sources of intelligence on the activities of the government of the RVN. They were also the most susceptible to the classical maneuver of doubling: taking money from and giving information to both sides. A source who was in a good position to make an evaluation of the collection capability of the city-agent teams during almost the entire period from May 1961 to December 1963 reported the following:

In the Saigon-Cholon area, the work of penetration agents was still rather insignificant. On the average, only four or five items of information were obtained each month. These items concerned the administrative control of residences, population census for military service and the like. . . . [We] never received any report concerning the internal situation of military units, the replacement of troops, operational plans. . . .¹⁵

It is, of course, impossible to give an accurate evaluation of this statement, but there is no evidence that the source was discredited by subsequent interrogations.

(C) The military intelligence detachment's relationship to the district detachments was one of liaison and guidance (see Fig. 11). The district detachments mirrored, on a smaller scale, the organization at Special Zone level and were answerable to the Operations Section of the District Military Affairs Committees. Intelligence reports were forwarded to Zone level by the district committees and collated for transmission to the Central Office and for operational planning by the Special Zone Committee and its troop commands. The source quoted previously has little good to say of this rural effort:

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


Fig. 11—Probable Organization of the Special Zone
Military Intelligence Apparatus, 1963

— Direct control
- - - Guidance and liaison

(C)

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Cu Chi and Binh Tan were the most efficient in intelligence collection work in the district level units. They produced fairly good reports on the local Republic of Vietnam military situation, but never succeeded in making an accurate estimate of [the government's] future plans. All intelligence activities were very poor in the other four districts [whose reports] . . . even on simple subjects such as location, strength, etc., of Republic of Vietnam military units were most often graded as "60 percent accurate" or "still very deficient in details."¹⁵

(C) The combat-readiness detachment (see Fig. 9) appeared, until 1964 at any rate, to be composed of a few junior officers who kept track of the strength, equipment, and morale of the Special Zone troop and guerrilla units. Their duties included the preparation of studies designed to produce recommendations for improving the battle posture of the military and paramilitary forces operating under the control of the Military Affairs Committee. In addition, the combat readiness detachment was responsible for all administrative matters pertaining to the dead and wounded and for evolving policies in this connection that would minimize the adverse effects on the morale of those who continued to struggle against the government. Little more can be said concerning this element. Its function is an important one to the successful implementation of a protracted guerrilla war. One can only assume, in the face of inadequate data, that the combat readiness detachment continued to exist and expand as the tempo of the insurgency increased.

Political Office

(U) Although nearly every element in the Special Zone Committee structure has at least one person designated as political officer, the Military Affairs Committee had as one of its three primary staff sections an element called the Political Office (see Fig. 8). This section was charged with instilling and maintaining Communist ideology and faith in the VC cause in the minds of the military personnel in the Special Zone. To this end the members of the Political Office were assigned duties involving the political education and testing of all soldiers, the development of Communist Party and youth-group organizations, and the eradication of situations that would tend to lower troop morale and engender defeatism concerning the ultimate VC triumph.


(C) As far as can be determined from the data at hand, the section consisted of some six captains or senior lieutenants who were supervised by a major as section chief. Figure 12 depicts what might well have been the title borne by each officer; it is quite likely that, as the scope of the VC effort increased, each officer was assigned additional commissioned and noncommissioned personnel to assist him in carrying out his duties. During the period from about 1961 to the end of 1963, however, only the security officer was assigned a sergeant as an assistant. The evaluations officer, moreover, functioned also as the political education officer.

(C) From 1961 to the end of 1963 the section was apparently located near the Operations Section in a hamlet of An Than Thon, just across the Saigon River from the northwest border of Cu Chi District.⁶

(C) The security officer and his assistant, at least in the 1961-1963 period, were hard-core Communists who had been trained in the north and infiltrated into Vietnam at the time of the establishment of the Special Zone.

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The security officer was responsible for investigating military personnel who were suspected of being anti-Communist or who were reported to be corrupt in financial or moral matters. In addition, he was required to maintain good community relations between the VC military and the local inhabitants by ensuring that the villagers were treated courteously by the soldiers. In appropriate cases he recommended suitable punishments for offenders to the chief of the Political Office.



(C) Fig. 12—Probable Organization of the Political Office of the Special Zone Military Affairs Committee, 1961–1964

(C) The evaluations officer, who was, logically enough, also the political education officer during 1961–1963, was also Hanoi-trained and infiltrated into the RVN in 1961. His job as political education officer was to keep close watch over the status of political indoctrination in the various military units of the Special Zone. As evaluation officer he was responsible for organizing programs to encourage soldiers to emulate the virtuous and single-minded behavior preached by the Communist Party. As part of his job he gave out competitive tests to be taken by personnel of the various military units and selected outstanding soldiers whose names would be furnished to the Special Zone Committee for official commendation.

(C) The party organization officer, as the title implies, was charged with encouraging and accounting for Communist Party and youth-group membership among personnel of the Special Zone's military elements. He maintained rosters of party members, membership-strength figures, and a program for soliciting new applicants for party and youth-group membership. In addition to the foregoing this officer kept books on the monthly dues paid by party and youth-group members; one witness explains the process thus:

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Monthly dues of a party or group member in the Republic of Vietnam are fixed at two . . . piasters. The basic party collecting unit keeps one third of the money collected for its expenditures, while the remaining two thirds are turned over to [the party organization officer]. One third of [this] money . . . is used to cover the expenditures of buying refreshments during meetings, making flags, slogans, printing party materials, etc., and the other two thirds are sent to the Political Office of [the Central Office for South Vietnam].⁶

(C) The cadre personnel officer was responsible for monitoring the careers of the key people in the military elements subordinate to the Special Zone Committee. To this end he kept cadre policy under review and made recommendations for changes to his superior. In addition he handled recommendations for promotion, letters of commendation, disciplinary action, and assignment for military cadresmen in the Special Zone whether they were party members or not. Apparently the choice assignments were meted out, not only on the basis of ability, but also with attention to the recipient's ideological outlook and belief in the success of the VC insurgency. It is quite probable that the cadre personnel officer coordinated his recommendations closely with other members of the Political Affairs Section who were in positions to judge the attitudes of the cadre.

(U) The political activities officer was responsible for organizing the programs and meetings designed to foster party solidarity within each military element of the Special Zone. This probably included such activities as youth-group rallies, recruiting cell operations, and party inductions.

(U) The Political Office, even though very small in size, wielded power far out of proportion to the number of persons assigned to it. The fact that each of the officers concerned held advanced military rank, was a hard-core Communist trained in Hanoi, and was a mature man (the average age in 1962 was about 40 years) persuades one of the importance attributed by the Military Affairs Committee to the political monitorship of the troops.

Rear Services Section


(C) The logistical support element of the Military Affairs Committee was responsible for monitoring the uninterrupted flow of the meager supplies available to the military units in the Special Zone. At least through 1964 the Rear Services Section was small, since only a few military units were subordinate to the Special Zone Committee. The Rear Services Section was organized somewhat as shown in Fig. 13 and its component detachments were scattered throughout the northern tip of Cu Chi District and the southern portions of the adjacent provinces, outside the Special Zone borders. From the time the section was organized until 1964, the chief and most of his subordinates were South Vietnamese who had not had the benefit of Hanoi training.

(C) The quartermaster detachment, as shown in Fig. 13, had three functional elements: one each for food and clothing and one for the procurement of other necessary items. The food unit was responsible for monitoring the distribution of rice, fish sauce, and whatever foodstuff came to hand among the military elements in the Special Zone. Rice for the troops was either grown by sympathizers or collected as taxes from truckers and farmers operating in the VC-controlled areas of the Special Zone. In 1962 and 1963 the unit operated its own rice mill and also utilized the mill at Ho Bo, at

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1½ miles north of the quartermaster detachment's area. The food unit stored the rice in the houses of certain sympathetic villagers and issued about 40 lb/month/person to those who presented valid VC requisitions.^{6,23} Recent allied search operations in the area have revealed that large quantities of rice are now stored in special hiding places, probably for issue on a larger scale. Most foodstuffs other than rice and fish sauce were purchased by the individual soldier or by his unit commander.



(C) Fig. 13—Organization of the Rear Services Section of the Special Zone Military Affairs Committee, 1962-1965

(C) The words of a participant best describe the operation of the clothing unit:

The clothing unit is charged with distributing clothing, hammocks, blankets and nylon sheets (used as protection against the rain). After purchasing cloth bags (originally used for United States Wheat) or cotton fabrics, the clothing unit usually asks the village party (chapters) to get help from families which have sewing machines to convert the fabrics into clothing. Each family is asked to make two or three suits a month, and each suit is paid for with a token amount of ten piasters, plus the cost of thread and buttons. Suits are made in three sizes: A (large), B (medium), and C (small), and are dyed black before delivery. Thanks to this method . . . the clothing unit does not need to purchase sewing machines which are expensive and difficult to conceal. . . .⁶

(This method certainly conserves VC manpower.) Clothing was apparently issued only to those who could not provide their own.

(U) The procurement unit seems to have been a petty-cash disbursement office rather than an agency for securing what the troops needed. Its duties included furnishing the troops with money for the purchase of additional food or drink and providing money to installations, such as the signal detachment, for the purchase of expendables (radio batteries, for instance) or to the ordnance workshops for the purchase of raw materials. The unit did apparently

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procure stationery supplies for issue directly to the troop units. This subject is discussed more fully in Chap. 7.

(C) The chief of the medical detachment in 1962-1963, who had been trained in the north and infiltrated back into Vietnam, was accorded the substantive rank of battalion executive officer. His unit operated a hospital and a field aid station (see Fig. 13). The hospital, where the most seriously wounded were evacuated when they could be moved, is reported to have been some 10 miles north of the northern tip of Cu Chi District. At least 15 medical personnel, including nurses, were stationed at this hospital. The field aid station for the Military Affairs Committee was located in the Loc Thuan area west of Ho Bo Hamlet where many elements of the committee were deployed until late 1965.^{5,22,24,25} This main aid station received patients from medical collection points to which the sick and the wounded from the battlefield had been carried. A VC who received training at the field aid station during May 1964 reported the following:

The dispensary is in a forest area within the Loc Thuan area. . . . There were nine small houses made of bamboo and covered in with nylon sheets, and two straw roofed houses.

In addition there were three [bamboo frames] with nylon [sheet] roofs used as first aid training class rooms. Upon completion of the training these nylon sheets were removed, only bamboo frames were left (nylon sheets belonged to the trainees).

[The station] has eight beds reserved for serious cases and two [shelters] with hammocks. . . . Newly received patients were authorized to lie in beds but when they got better they were to be moved to the two . . . [shelters] and lie in hammocks. This dispensary only gave treatment to wounded and patients [with] common diseases. Serious cases were to be evacuated to other places for treatment.²⁵

As far as can be determined, most of the pharmaceuticals acquired by the medical detachment came from Saigon through intermediate, legitimate-looking distributors, for example, a drugstore in the Ho Bo area.^{5,6}

(C) From the time it was organized until some time in 1965 the ordnance detachment was commanded by a middle-aged officer who had never been north for training. He, like the chief of the medical detachment, ranked as a battalion executive officer. The two workshops that he operated were collocated in the Duong Minh Chau forest northwest of the tip of Cu Chi District,⁶ but there is evidence of similar facilities in the vicinity of Ho Bo.^{5,24}

(C) In 1964 the main workshop (see Fig. 13) employed about 100 VC in three sections. One section manufactured mines, grenades, and crude firearms; one reloaded spent cartridges that had been carefully collected from the battlefield; and the third section repaired weapons that the armorers in the combat units had been unable to fix. The special workshop employed about a dozen workers who manufactured bombs, grenades, and mines for the exclusive use of saboteurs and terrorists operating in the city of Saigon.

(C) This, then, completes an account of the structure of the Military Affairs Committee during the period from its establishment until 1965. Since then allied military pressure in the area must have given rise to many changes in location, strength, and procedure. It is quite likely that until 1965 there were fewer than 3000 VC military personnel subordinate to the Special Zone and the paramilitary strength, as represented by the various guerrilla units, has also been estimated as a relatively insignificant figure.

Chapter 4

PROPAGANDA APPARATUS

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

(U) The VC campaign to recruit adherents and to subvert the incumbent government receives as much emphasis as the military and political effort in South Vietnam. The testimony of participants, the content of captured documents, and VC performance reveal the following picture of VC policy after the partition of Vietnam by the Geneva Accords in 1954.

(U) Open aggression, using North Vietnamese troops, against South Vietnam in order to bring about a unified and independent Communist government would be dangerous. Such overt action would be a clear violation of the Geneva Agreements and would be an invitation to the anti-Communist powers to intervene. Intervention would result in an all-out war with sophisticated weapons, which would bring devastation to South Vietnam, alienate the people, and ravage North Vietnam just when she should be strengthening her independence. Therefore the Communist Party's objectives would have to be achieved more subtly.

(U) The policy makers then considered the feasibility of motivating the entire South Vietnamese population, including as much of the government sector as possible, to press for reunification under some sort of coalition government acceptable to Ho Chi Minh. This course of action was discarded because it would involve North Vietnam in a long, debilitating support effort. VC strength alone, both in numbers and influence, was inadequate to the task.

(U) Elimination of these courses of action led to the conclusion that Communist objectives could best be attained by the low-key instigation of piecemeal insurrection, first in those South Vietnamese localities most amenable to the idea, then in other areas.

(U) Having resolved on the level at which the insurgent campaign was to be conducted in South Vietnam, the planners proceeded to outline the strategy to be used in its implementation. VC military action in the localities selected for insurrection obviously could not prevail against the superior numbers and equipment of the South Vietnamese armed forces; military action must then be supplemented with campaigns on two additional fronts. First, the will of the South Vietnamese to resist must be weakened, their faith in the incumbent leadership must be shaken, and they must be convinced that their future lies with the VC. Second, the willing support of the South Vietnamese people in

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each locality selected for action must be assured; they must be made politically aware of the advantages that would be theirs under the unified regime provided by VC leadership.

(C) Here, then, was the strategy of Ba Mat Giap Cong—^{8,26,27} the three-pronged attack. The prongs were military action, proselyting action, and political action; none could succeed without the other two in persuading the South Vietnamese to cast their lot with the VC. This chapter deals with an aspect of the proselyting prong, propaganda, in the Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone. The Special Zone proselyting apparatus was discussed in an earlier study.¹

(C) The intimately associated activities of proselyting and propaganda were conducted by distinctly separate elements of the Special Zone Committee, although one piece of evidence acquired in November 1966 makes mention of a new organization, the "Propaganda, Culture and Proselyting Unit."²⁸ The importance of propaganda in the VC insurgency is clearly expressed in a translation of an undated draft of a VC publication,²⁹ which points up the need for a vigorous propaganda program designed to enlighten the people of the RVN. The objectives of the program are to enlist the people's sympathy for the insurgents and to arouse indignation against the incumbent government. The translation continues:

Through the period of covert activity of the Party, nine years of resistance and seven years of political struggle in South Vietnam, propaganda [has] always played [an] important role in the awakening and motivation of the people [to support the Viet Cong movement and thwart the enemy]. During many years of political struggle in South Vietnam. . . propaganda was almost the only. . . powerful weapon [which the party had]. . . to defeat the enemy and to. . . develop the revolutionary movement. . . among the population.

Today, in the decisive. . . three-front attack: Military, political, and. . . proselyting, propaganda constitutes a very important weapon. . .²⁹

NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM

(U) In any examination of the VC propaganda program it is advisable to say a few words about the NFLSVN. The National Liberation Front is exactly what its name implies: a front, or cover organization, for the Vietnamese Communist Party. Its mission is to sell the party line to the masses by appeal to social, professional, religious, and ethnic groups in the RVN and to present to the outside world a facsimile of a popularly supported, rival nationalistic group that opposes the government of the RVN. The National Liberation Front is designed to provide the public face for the Communist regime that seeks to oust the incumbent government. When one deals with the Central Committee of the NFLSVN, one is dealing with an organ of the Communist Party, whether it is labeled Workers' Party, as in North Vietnam, or People's Revolutionary Party, as it is in the south.

(U) The most prominent elements of the National Liberation Front since its creation in late 1960 have had as their target audiences the farmers, women, and youth of the RVN. Among the elements that sought to organize these three groups in the Special Zone were the so-called "Liberation Associations" and

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others. The principal associations are named in the following list. (The same association may possibly be listed more than once by different names; however, a careful check of the leaders' identities has been made, where possible, to reduce errors.)

- (U) The Association of Farmers for the Liberation of South Vietnam
- The Women's Liberation Association
- The Youth Liberation Association
- The South Vietnam Liberation Students' Union
- The Writers' and Artists' Liberation Association
- The Liberation Journalists' Association
- The Veterans of the Indochina War
- The Liberation Press Agency
- The Liberation Broadcasting Net
- The Liberation Federation of Trade Unions
- The Liberation Workers' Association
- The National Front for the Liberation of Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh
- The Bourgeoisie Intellectual Front

(C) The roles of the Liberation Associations seem to have duplicated those of the propaganda and proselyting elements of the Special Zone Committee, particularly in areas such as Cu Chi District where the VC held a degree of control. In any event, the Committee's Propaganda and Indoctrination Section maintained close coordination with the National Liberation Front and with its sister organization devoted to proselyting. During an interrogation a VC prisoner, who held a key position in the Special Zone Committee structure from 1960 until his capture in 1964, made this revealing statement about the role of the National Liberation Front:

In general, the rural (village and hamlet) [National Liberation Front] organizations, such as the farmers', youths' and women's organizations, had their own executive committees and cadre sections, which were under the direct supervision of the Village Party Chapter Committee [i.e., in the Special Zone's chain of command, not the National Liberation Front's]. . . . The executive committees of the Farmers', Youths', or Women's Liberation Associations were staffed by cadre from the Farmers', Youths', or Women's Proselyting Sections of the Village Party Chapter Committee. Consequently, the chain of command for these [National Liberation Front] associations at the hamlet [level] extended to the respective organizations at the village [level], then to the Farmers', Youth's, or Women's Proselyting Sections of the Village Party Chapter Committee, and in turn to the respective [proselyting] sections at the District Party Committee [and Special Zone Committee].³⁰

This paragraph makes good sense out of the relation between the professional Communist cadre and the cover organization known as the NFLSVN.


PROPAGANDA PROGRAM IN THE SPECIAL ZONE

(U) The section of the Special Zone Committee charged with directing the dissemination of propaganda and with the indoctrination of persons who have cast their lot with the insurgents is, most probably, highly flexible in its organization. Most sources generally agree that the section is responsible for the functions shown in Fig. 14. That this diagram portrays an actual compartmentalized organization is doubtful, but for the purposes of discussion and

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analysis in this chapter it will be assumed that specific subsections of the Propaganda and Indoctrination Section of the Special Zone Committee are held responsible for the functions shown.

(C) In 1962, in order to ensure the effectiveness of the new Special Zone Committee's propaganda activity, the Central Office for South Vietnam assigned one of its own experts to be chief of the Propaganda and Indoctrination Section. The chief of the Central Office's propaganda apparatus is also reported to have



(C)

Fig. 14—Functions of the Special Zone Propaganda and Indoctrination Section

been active in personally supervising the growth and direction of the section. By early 1964 the Propaganda and Indoctrination Section boasted some 165 cadre personnel operating from scattered bases near Ho Bo Hamlet in northern Cu Chi District.⁵

Administration and Supply

(C) In 1961 the support functions for the Propaganda and Indoctrination Section were probably performed by one or two sub rosa VC who eked out the minimum requirements for the tiny new section, which was to be responsible for propagandizing the people in the Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone. As the apparatus grew, so did the administration and supply element, which by 1963 comprised at least 18 supervisors equipped with five typewriters.⁵

(U) The administrative function, as such, must have included all the conventional duties, including correspondence for the section and payment of its personnel. Like the rest of the VC machinery, the administrative personnel operated in villagers' houses, moving from place to place as the situation dictated.

(C) The supplies for the Propaganda and Indoctrination Section were bought and stored underground or concealed in the houses of sympathizers

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pending issue to users. The procurement system seems to have been very basic in that supply personnel simply organized the villagers into purchasing teams. When the farmers went to Saigon to deliver their produce they purchased the required office supplies: printing paper and ink, radio batteries, and the like. On return to their homes, the villagers turned these supplies over to the VC, who thus replenished their stocks. By spreading the purchases among a number of persons the VC were able to avoid arousing the suspicions of Saigon merchants and police. The villagers were apparently happy because the Propaganda Section supply personnel allowed them a few piasters' profit on the transactions.¹⁷

Research and Policy Formulation

(C) One element of the Propaganda and Indoctrination Section was responsible for monitoring the propaganda themes to be used in the Special Zone. These themes and policies concerning their use in the propaganda campaign were determined through careful study of the attitudes of the people and stories in the newspapers. A captured document purporting to be a set of instructions published by the Central Office as guidance to all VC propaganda cadres operating in the RVN gives the following specific list³¹ of the duties of research and policy personnel at all levels:

(a) Examine propaganda objectives in the light of the political and ideological motivation of the masses to be influenced.

(b) Conduct research on suitable propaganda stories and proper means for their dissemination to the press.

(c) Maintain a full understanding of the motivations of target groups—ethnic, religious, and professional—by constant research on their cultural orientations.

(d) Prepare political guidance for use in propaganda dissemination and training courses.

(e) Furnish direction to propaganda elements at district and subordinate levels.

Training and Indoctrination

(U) In the process of building an organization dedicated to standardizing ideology and ordering the thoughts of the people toward a common end, the training function assumes a high level of importance. In the Special Zone this function was apparently organized to cater to the needs of the rural areas as a training problem separate from the urban. The differentiation between training in the two areas can best be made from an operational point of view; training programs and policies for both areas stemmed from a principal subelement of the Propaganda and Indoctrination Section.

(U) As is true of any Communist organization, rather specific objectives were set at the top echelon for ideological indoctrination and party training. A Special Zone aspirant to membership in the party was required to undergo intensive training before his acceptance as a provisional party member. Participants in specific aspects of the propaganda operation were required to attend specialist schools where VC and North Vietnamese provided the instruction.

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(C) As with all its subordinate elements, the Special Zone Committee leaders took no chances with the political orientation of the cadre personnel who were to guide the Propaganda and Indoctrination Section. In early 1961 a political reeducation school was established outside the Special Zone in Tay Ninh Province about 12 miles east of the city of Tay Ninh. Persons who had been selected to form the cadre for the new Special Zone Committee were sent to this school before assuming their duties.¹⁹ The school was run by party stalwarts selected by the Central Office for South Vietnam from among its own propaganda and indoctrination personnel.³² Apparently after the VC consolidated their control over certain areas of the Special Zone, this school was moved nearer the committee headquarters and its curriculum broadened to include indoctrination courses for personnel below cadre level. One participant relates that in May 1964 he was led through the jungle to the vicinity of Moi Hamlet in Nhuan Duc Village of Cu Chi District, where he received a month of "ideological reform" before attending a "recruit" training school run by the Central Office.³³

(C) In addition to a school for party members, the training program conducted by the Propaganda and Indoctrination Section included courses for propaganda cell leaders, schoolteachers, writers, and artists. Instruction was tailored to prepare the student for operations in the countryside or in the city, depending on the area contemplated for his employment. The Central Office continued to operate training courses designed to ensure that the propaganda output in the RVN was consistent. One such course was conducted for journalists and public information personnel in the vicinity of Tapang Village, about 11 miles northwest of the city of Tay Ninh. In 1963-1964, one source⁵ reports, three 5-month courses for about 170 students each were conducted in this location. The students were drawn from all subordinate levels of propaganda and indoctrination cadres and were subjected to intensive training in such subjects as drama, journalism, propaganda and oral presentation, materialistic philosophy, political and armed-struggle policy, and religious propaganda techniques. To round out the theoretical training the Special Zone Committee saw to it that the Propaganda and Indoctrination Section supervised on-the-job training for key members of the organization.

Dissemination of Propaganda

(U) The VC left out no medium of communication in propagandizing the people of the RVN. In the Special Zone's Propaganda and Indoctrination Sections were cells, branches, subsections, and "desks" devoted to using every form of the arts, every kind of social institution, and every means of verbal communication to foster the dissemination of Communist propaganda.

(C) Special entertainment groups, featuring plays with a message and ancient folk songs that could be construed to support the party line, toured the villages of the Special Zone.¹⁹ Painters and sculptors were encouraged to join, first the associations fostered by the party as cultural arms of the National Liberation Front, then the Communist Party—providing the artist in question proved enthusiastic and effective in propagandizing through the medium of his talent. A directive from the Central Office, probably prepared in 1964 at the latest, lists the duties of Propaganda and Indoctrination Section personnel responsible for "Arts and Culture" as follows:^{5,31}

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(a) Research the classical arts for works that serve the propaganda objectives of the party.

(b) Compose appropriate plays and scripts for motion pictures and for entertainers who have been indoctrinated and trained for presentation.

(c) Supervise the training and performance of entertainers.

(d) Provide for the publication of art works and manuscripts that purvey the propaganda themes of the moment.

(e) Ensure that the various arts groups involve themselves with the Arts Associations sponsored by the NFLSVN; supervise their activities.

(C) In order to implement this directive the Special Zone's Propaganda and Indoctrination Section apparently organized branches charged with supervision of each artistic endeavor. For example, certain branches were concerned with

... painting, lithography, and engraving; making and showing motion pictures; producing photographic propaganda of the effects of enemy action on the people; and producing propaganda pieces for periodicals such as the Liberation Flag newspaper and the Liberation Arts and Culture magazine.³¹

(C) In their use of social institutions to serve VC propaganda objectives, the Special Zone Committee sought to capture the various clubs, religious groups, ethnic groups (particularly the Chinese), and the various teachers' organizations. Schoolteachers who had been indoctrinated and trained in the party system were instructed to propagandize their students and to ensure that school libraries included material for indoctrinating the young readers.

(C) In their use of the other means of verbal communication, the Propaganda and Indoctrination Section supervised the organization of radio, word-of-mouth, and pamphlet-printing programs. The radio branch received and transmitted propaganda put out by the Liberation Broadcasting Station. This facility was set up by the Communists in 1962 to broadcast propaganda for 1/2 hr/day in Vietnamese; 1/4 hr/day each in English, Cambodian, French, and Chinese; and in various dialects of these languages on certain days of the week.³⁴ The branch responsible for starting whispering campaigns or the person-to-person communication of propaganda organized teams in various parts of the Special Zone. These teams were trained to make use of the villagers and city folk, witting or unwitting, to spread the day's propaganda themes. Finally, in the use of written communication, the Propaganda and Indoctrination Section printed leaflets and pamphlets that could be mailed and distributed, surreptitiously or otherwise, to the South Vietnamese people.

Propaganda Operations

(C) As indicated in Fig. 14, the Special Zone Committee made a distinction between rural and urban propaganda operations. The city functions discussed in this section were not all carried out in Saigon, since many of them had to be implemented in safe areas, but they were specifically aimed at the urban audience. The data show that operations in the city, where the preponderance of the population dwelt, were accorded more emphasis than operations in the countryside. The Special Zone Committee itself apparently made the decisions on urban operations and left the rural aspects to the Propaganda and Indoctrination Section's discretion.

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Fig. 15—Area Occupied by the Special Zone Propaganda and Indoctrination Section, 1962–1964

- Houses
- Tunnel entrance
- Foot path
1. Cache for equipment
 2. Committee office
 3. Troop proselyting section
 4. School
 5. Medical section
 6. Weapons storage and security section
 7. Labor proselyting section
 8. Tailor shop used as transshipment point for supplies
 9. Typing and printing shop

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(C) Despite the elaborate organizational structure outlined here, the propaganda effort was in reality a small, rather primitive operation. As noted earlier, at the peak of its effectiveness in late 1964 probably about 165 cadre and permanent members⁵ were assigned to the Propaganda and Indoc-trination Section. Their base of operations was in the Ho Bo Hamlet area of Cu Chi District, about 24 miles northwest of Saigon. An examination of the composition of this installation indicates the small, austere scale on which the VC operated.

(C) As previously indicated, the Ho Bo area sheltered a large segment of the Special Zone Committee almost from the time it was organized. Vil-lagers' small houses, a few thatched huts, and several hundred meters of tunnel comprised the whole installation, of which the Propaganda and Indoc-trination Section's installations were only a small part. Figure 15 presents a rough sketch of the area, which covers about 6 sq mi; in it were located most




Fig. 16--Saigon-Cholon City Propaganda Net, Early 1964

of the personnel, supplies, and printing facilities of the whole section. The description by a knowledgeable witness of one of the printing facilities indicates that in 1964 the VC were using a primitive hand-operated silk-screen stencil process to produce propaganda leaflets and bulletins for the entire Special Zone; one stencil could produce a maximum of 1000 copies. As an economy measure, one container of printers ink was diluted with oils to produce three containers of ink. The cadre responsible for motion pictures was reported to be equipped with one 16-mm projector and a single generator; it was rumored that several hundred dollars had been saved for a Japanese movie camera, but the camera was not in evidence by the end of 1964.¹⁷ The radio propaganda team operated with two radios. The still-photography team was equipped with three cameras and a single enlarger. All in all, the propaganda operations were not distinguished by their magnitude.

(C) City Propaganda Net. Propaganda operations in the city were conducted by what appears to have been an elite group that comprised a city propaganda net. Figure 16 represents a diagram of the organization of this

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net as it is described by a number of sources. As previously noted, the Special Zone Committee seems to have exercised primary control over the net from its inception and to have required the same sort of rigid compartmentalization and secrecy that one finds in an intelligence network. To this end the city was divided into three control areas, which were located in Boroughs III, V, and VI, as shown in the plan of Saigon in Fig. 17.^{26,35,36} Propaganda operations were obviously not limited to the areas shown; rather, each was a focal point for an organization such as that shown in Fig. 16.

(C) The functions of liaison, protection, and the little administration necessary occupied the time of seven or eight persons: probably four for lookouts and guards during meetings, two or three as liaison agents and guides, and the remainder to receive messages and keep operations going. The organizers and recruiters, as the name implies, were responsible for getting people who lived in the neighborhood to help in spreading propaganda as dictated by the Propaganda and Indoctrination Section or the Special Zone Committee. These groups utilized the three-man cell structure in which only the cell leader knew the other two members and only the team chief knew the cell leaders; the personnel for these cells were mostly local workmen.^{5,26} Leaflets were distributed for each control area, either by passing them out in the marketplace or leaving them at stores and residences in various neighborhoods. Finally, each area control agency employed a group of trusted local people to make sure that the current propaganda themes were kept circulating through the different parts of the city. The whispering campaigns against officials of the government, stories of Vietnamese and allied armed forces' atrocities, VC successes—all provided excellent gossip for the neighborhood marketplaces.


(C) The Propaganda and Indoctrination Section expanded and improved its techniques in the years between its initial formation and 1966, when it was apparently still functioning along the lines described here. The section's task was more difficult in the city, for its members' activities must have been severely circumscribed by the vigilance of the metropolitan police and special branch agents. In the countryside, where scattered huts, tunnels, and the jungle provided concealment, no really urgent need existed for forged identity papers; the villagers were, in all likelihood, quite willing to keep quiet and to stay out of trouble with either the VC or the government forces.

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(C) Fig. 17—Plan of Saigon Showing Central Locations of the City Propag
 ----- Borough boundaries

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Showing Central Locations of the City Propaganda Net, 1961-1966

----- Borough boundaries

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Chapter 5

PARTY ORGANIZATION, SECURITY, AND INTELLIGENCE

INTRODUCTION

(C) Within the Special Zone Committee the responsibilities for the organization, administration, and control of party membership; the maintenance of security; and the collection, collation, and dissemination of political and strategic intelligence are vested respectively in the staff sections shown in Fig. 7 as Organization, Security, and Intelligence. Understandably enough, the information available on the subjects of security and intelligence is scanty. The testimony of some sources almost leads one to believe that either the two functions are performed by the same section or that the two sections are, in some respects, duplicative. There must be two separate sections, however, for several captured documents¹³ of undoubted authenticity allocate separate cover designations, which are substantiated in interrogation reports, to each section.

ORGANIZATION SECTION

(C) The operations of the Organization Section are administrative in nature and much of the data indicate that the activities of this section are directed by only a few cadre.⁵ The Organization Section of the Special Zone Committee was created in 1960 and undoubtedly expanded as the requirements on it increased. Few solid data on the section's growth have come to light, but a VC document dated 1965 indicates that four Special Zone Committee members supervised its performance at that time.³⁷

(C) The subordinate offices of the Organization Section may have well been similar to those of the Military Affairs Committee's Political Office (see Fig. 12). One source mentions a section chief and assistant, an administrative subsection, a cadre subsection, and a correspondence and statistics subsection. The section chief and the heads of the three offices were members of the Special Zone Committee.³⁷

(U) As is the case with most of the other Special Zone staff elements, each subordinate element at district level seems to have had a similar staff section and the Military Affairs Committee had its own party organization officer (see Fig. 12). One assumes, therefore, that at Special Zone level, the Organization Section was primarily an administrative office responsible for

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the consolidation of reports on party membership from subordinate and collateral agencies.

(U) The party members within each element of the Special Zone represented a select inner circle that was expected to foster Communist discipline among their nonmember colleagues. Provisional party membership was granted to those who appeared to have seen the light and expressed a serious wish to join. After a suitable probationary period and thorough investigation these persons were granted full membership or were denied admittance.

(C) Within each echelon, from the village level to the top,^{11,12} organization of the party members was achieved according to specific rules promulgated by the so-called "Peoples' Revolutionary Party." As previously discussed, the party chapter at the village or hamlet level was the basic organized unit—or cell—comprised of three party members or provisional members. Three such cells were entitled to a party chapter secretary and an assistant. When the party membership exceeded nine persons a committee of two assisted the secretary and when the number exceeded 14, the chapter committee was expanded to five or more persons. A village-level secretary was required to have been a full-fledged party member for at least 1 year, a district secretary for 3 years, and a province secretary for 5 years.^{11,38}

(C) It was the responsibility of the Organization Section to keep track of these party chapters. Apparently the section was collocated with the Secretariat, or that portion of it which remained stationary. Specifically their duties appear to have been as follows:

- (C) (a) Monitor the overall party organization in the Special Zone.
- (b) Maintain biographies and personnel records of each party member.
- (c) Make recommendations for the promotion and assignment of cadre party members.
- (d) See to the enforcement of party discipline.
- (e) Approve the admission of new party members.

SECURITY SECTION

(U) In order to minimize penetration of the Special Zone organization by government agents, the Central Office assigned personnel from its own security group to the Special Zone Committee early in 1961. Apparently this group assisted in building up the committee's own Security Section while it also conducted counterespionage and counterintelligence operations.

(C) By about the end of 1962 the Special Zone Security Section was firmly established with two branches: one concerned with the security of the organization in the rural areas and the other with security in the city.⁵ The Special Zone Committee must have accorded high priority to its Security Section, for among the personnel assigned to the cadre at various times until at least 1965 were a full member of the Special Zone Committee, a member of the Standing Group, a party chapter secretary, and two other men who were promoted to membership in the Security Section of the Central Office for South Vietnam.¹²

(C) Although the operations of the Security Section are, as would be expected, shrouded in mystery, one source reports the following:

The operation of this section was similar to that of the Republic of Vietnam's Special Police Branch [Special Branch of the National Police]; an unknown number of

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Viet Cong Security agents operated within Saigon. . . . [In 1964] approximately 90 covert security agents operated in the villages and Saigon. These agents were paid regular salaries.¹⁷

(C) The counterespionage responsibility of the section entailed personnel investigations and thorough biographic checks of cadre personnel. When a VC cadre defected to the RVN or was captured, the Security Section instituted immediate precautions. The cadre's installation or unit was required to change its location and increase its security measures at once.⁷ There are indications that the agency head involved was required to redouble his vigilance over his personnel and that he was subjected to disciplinary action.

(U) The Security Section was clearly not responsible for the physical security of bases other than in a supervisory sense. Guards and perimeter defense of rural installations were, and apparently still are, provided by militia units or village guerrillas.

INTELLIGENCE SECTION

(U) The Intelligence Section of the Special Zone Committee was charged with the supervision of all intelligence activities other than those monitored by the Military Affairs Committee. Few solid data concerning the details of these nonmilitary intelligence activities are available; these few are reviewed here to provide some sort of framework for use in future research on the subject.

(C) In May 1961 the Central Office is said to have dispatched three or four of its intelligence cadre to the Special Zone for the purpose of organizing an Intelligence Section for the Special Zone Committee.³⁹ The section was actually directed by the Central Office, though subordinated on paper to the Special Zone Committee. It appears that the promise of successful operations in the fertile field represented by the city of Saigon with its many government offices led the VC headquarters to retain control rather than to entrust monitoring to any subordinate echelon exclusively. By mid-1961 the Intelligence Section had about 20 men equipped with a few ill-sorted small arms. Their mission was to recruit and train penetration agents for the collection of strategic intelligence on the RVN. In September 1961 additional cadre, recently returned from North Vietnam, were assigned to the section. Some sources indicate that at this point the Central Office shifted control of the Special Zone Intelligence Section to the military; however, the assignment of cover designations indicates that its function remained separate from the military. The classic cellular structure was maintained and the operations of the section continued to be improved along with the quality of its agents so that, in effect, the Special Zone Intelligence Section monitored an integral portion of the Central Office's intelligence net.

(C) The experiences of an espionage agent who was captured and interrogated furnish some interesting details that, even if false in some respects, help to fill in a few voids. The agent in question joined the Viet Minh in 1945, the Communist Party in 1951, and by 1954 had risen to the rank of platoon leader in the resistance forces. After the partition of his country, the agent decided to remain in the south, where in 1956 he became a minor party official in one of the district Communist organizations.

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In July 1963, [he] was notified . . . that he had been selected to work in cities rather than in rural areas. . . . He was instructed to obtain a 4X6 centimeter photograph of himself . . . [to] be used to make a false identity card. . . . About 15 days after the November 1963 coup [he was introduced to]. . . a Central Bureau-level intelligence cadre who had infiltrated the Republic of Vietnam.⁴⁰

The agent was informed that he would act as liaison with other Central Office espionage agents in the city of Saigon and in Nha Trang. He then went to an isolated spot in the jungle where he was trained for several months in security matters, VC doctrine, and policy: how to behave like a city dweller and get food and lodging; how to avoid government control points on his travel routes; and how to make contacts with fellow agents and strangers in cities.

(C) In January 1964 the agent was sent on a practice mission to acquaint him with routes he must use and to find himself lodging in Saigon. The practice mission lasted 8 days, during which the agent, using some of the 30,000 piasters he was given, dressed and equipped himself to look like a respectable city resident and made the round trip to Saigon. In the city the agent was required to make a contact and deliver a letter; he then returned to his rendezvous point, from which he was escorted back to his hiding place in the jungle and was debriefed; apparently he had passed his test. After resting in his hiding place for a month or so, the agent received orders to establish himself in Saigon and to collect political and economic intelligence with emphasis on the strengths and weaknesses of the US Agency for International Development (USAID). He was instructed to find a businessman or government employee who appeared to be ripe for recruitment as a VC agent and to report his find to the Central Office agent for follow-up. As cover the Special Zone agent was to purchase a small business in Saigon that would enable him to travel about freely and to make contacts among government and business people. Pending establishment of this more or less permanent cover, the subject was to contact a fellow agent on a prearranged schedule and in a series of locations. He proceeded to Saigon a second time and began carrying out his instructions. In the course of a trip between Nha Trang and Saigon in June 1964, his bus was stopped at a government checkpoint. The agent's false identity card aroused suspicion, and when the police opened his suitcase they found a large amount of cash and a bottle of invisible ink; his espionage career was at an end. This account of a curiously amateurish venture in espionage is not untypical and may warrant the conclusion that the VC, at least as late as 1964, were not as successful in their formalized intelligence operations as they were in obtaining military intelligence.

(C) As is suggested by the recruiting mission assigned to the agent in the foregoing account, the VC intelligence apparatus in the Special Zone placed emphasis on recruiting agents in place among the government offices in Saigon. An intelligence organization chart shown in a VC document captured in 1965³⁸ displays a number of boxes labeled "double agent" cadre or element, a fact that tends to strengthen this hypothesis. Moreover, a friendly agent report received in 1961 makes mention of a special VC organization for espionage in Saigon and Bangkok, whose members in Saigon were assigned the mission of getting themselves recruited by representatives of the Vietnamese and US governments in order to establish intelligence nets within these offices.⁴¹ The nets thus established were then used to disseminate to the two governments a coordinated false line of VC "intelligence" and to collect strategic intelligence on Vietnamese and American operations and plans.

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Chapter 6

COURIER AND LIAISON SERVICES

BACKGROUND

(U) The Special Zone's "underground railway" has been referred to by various names since its establishment in 1960. Until 1965 the section responsible for the secure transmission of goods and documents and the guiding of people between VC elements and secret areas, according to most translators, was called the "Communications Liaison Section." More recently the name "Postal Communications and Transportation Section" seems to have been applied. In any event, it is believed that the title used here best describes the function of this element, whose duties are closely related to those of both the security and intelligence elements.

(C) In 1961 the Courier and Liaison Section was located in the Loc Thuan forest area, adjacent to the western border of the northern tip of Cu Chi District; by 1964 it had moved into Cu Chi near other Special Zone Committee elements in the northern tip of the district.

(C) Not a great deal of information has come to light on the formal organization of the Courier and Liaison Section, but it clearly maintained rest stations and relay points along safe routes used by the VC to lead sympathizers to and from Saigon and various safe havens. There is also evidence that these relay points were used for food collection and transshipment in support of local VC agencies.^{37,42} Mail was classified according to its urgency as well as its content, for the Central Office directed that the word "Flash" be marked on the most urgent communications for the Special Zone Committee. Only secret documents in packages weighing less than 15 lb were permitted to be sent through the Flash channel. All agencies were cautioned to keep the Courier and Liaison Section and the Flash communications detachment advised of any changes in location.⁴³

TRAINING

(C) A VC training document written in 1965 provides detailed instructions for couriers and liaison agents operating in cities such as Saigon;⁴⁴ much of the material contained therein is confirmed by other sources.

(C) The document outlines the need for an efficient clandestine liaison between the leadership and the working echelons and points out that unless

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each agent in the chain seeks constantly to improve his techniques, the enemy is sure to discover the apparatus. The two basic requirements placed on agents of the Courier and Liaison Section are as follows:

(a) Be prompt and maintain an uninterrupted flow of messages and people through the courier and liaison channels.

(b) Ensure the long-range security of the system by maintaining complete secrecy and a high degree of compartmentalization.

(C) In order to meet these requirements, the courier and liaison agents were given the following specific instructions:

(a) Seek constantly to improve your courage, knowledge of the mission, and techniques.

(b) Preserve the security of the system by mingling unobtrusively with the crowd, keeping your mission secret even in the bosom of your family, maintaining vigilance and plausible cover even among friends, and concealing your documents immediately on receipt.

(c) Never lose your composure. Be prepared for any eventuality by studying the enemy's habits, knowing where his checkpoints on your route are located, and having ready answers to any question you may be asked.

(d) Minimize your risks by varying your dress and schedule, using different routes, and checking for a tail. Never lose sight of your mission; if the agent you are to contact is even a few minutes late for the rendezvous, leave at once.

(e) In making a contact be sure of the prearranged site and recognition signs, be exactly on time, observe the rendezvous area carefully for possible trouble, and greet your contact as an old friend whether you know him or not. Never carry documents to the rendezvous.

(f) When acting as a courier assume that you will be searched and conceal your documents accordingly. If you must deliver documents in public, do it in a crowd, preferably by exchanging containers with the other courier. After delivering documents separate at once without seeming to hurry.

(g) When acting as a guide for personnel, brief them on the route you will follow, ask no questions, and carry no incriminating papers. Get on and off buses separately; if you suspect danger, signal to your people and get off at different stops; if all goes well, do not walk together near the bus stop until the bus is out of sight. When you reach the designated Courier and Liaison Station avoid everyone except the person who is to receive your people.

(h) If at some point search seems inevitable, display no emotion but present yourself to the inspector who appears to be the most careless of the lot. If the material that you are carrying is cumbersome try to disassociate yourself from it.

(i) If you are arrested do everything in your power to destroy the evidence; sacrifice your life, if need be, to preserve the security of the system.

(j) Learn from experience and improve your technique with each mission.

OPERATIONS

(U) Reports on the interrogation of many VC who served in the Courier and Liaison Section of the Special Zone over the years are readily available.

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In order to compare the implementation with the instructions it is of interest to examine several of these accounts.

(C) In 1959 a 33-year-old Saigon dressmaker was recruited by the VC to distribute propaganda leaflets in the city. She did as she was told and in 1960 was selected for 3 months' training as a Courier and Liaison Section agent at a secret location in the country. In 1961 the woman was assigned to the Courier and Liaison Section of the Special Zone and given a route between Saigon and a hamlet near the town of Cu Chi. During the first half of 1961 she made 10 contacts with a 19-year-old girl agent at the An Dong bus station in Saigon but returned empty-handed to Cu Chi each time. As recognition and "all clear" signs the girl held a loaf of bread in her arms. The courier carried a cabbage. Their password, to be used in conversation when needed, was "sum up to make ten." In late 1961 the woman met the same girl at the Lang Ong bus station by Le Van Duyet Temple in Gia Dinh and picked up an old woman to be escorted back to the station near Cu Chi. Apparently the courier was being tested by the VC during the 10 previous missions and was now considered reliable. For the next 3 years the dressmaker carried documents, concealed inside fruit or other unlikely containers, and guided people between Saigon and her station near Cu Chi. She was caught in May 1964, when she was making her first trip on a new route from Saigon to a station near Tay Ninh. The woman claims that she was never aware of the content of the documents she carried or the identity of the people she escorted.^{35,45}

(C) An interesting though brief description of the Courier and Liaison Section stations along one of the secret routes within Cu Chi District of the Special Zone is furnished by a young man whose career as a VC agent lasted for 9 months during 1964. He tells of four stations on an 18-mile route between Ho Bo Hamlet and the town of Tan Phu Trung, located on the main road 15 miles northwest of Saigon. According to his account, each of the stations was manned by three persons and had a 4-sq-yd thatched hut for storage of foodstuffs to be issued to VC in the area. Two of the stations were completely unarmed; the terminal station at the south end of the route was armed with 11 hand grenades, and the terminal station at the north end of the route was armed with a pistol. The route followed by couriers from station to station avoided roads almost entirely, passing through the jungle and along streams.⁴²

(C) Some interesting details are furnished in the account of a third Courier and Liaison Section agent who managed to operate from late 1960 until he turned himself in to government authorities in November 1964. This agent worked out of the station near Tan Phu Trung for 11 months, then was transferred in November 1961 to Hoc Mon, where he received and passed on documents for almost a year. In October 1962 he was ordered to Saigon, given about \$10 for 2 months' salary, and told to establish himself among the shoe-blacks who worked around the Binh Duong bus station in the city, until contacted. The agent did as he was told, sleeping at night in one of the parked buses, until he established contact with a female courier. It developed that the woman traveled between Tay Ninh and the Tay Ninh bus station in Saigon, where she took a cab to the Binh Duong bus station to make the contact and exchange documents. If there was any Flash mail she arrived about 10 AM; if she had not arrived by 2:30 PM, it meant that there was no mail on that day. The Saigon agent was expected to keep a daily watch for her. Often the documents were transferred at a restaurant where the couriers would have a drink together

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and then leave, each taking the other's identical bag containing the documents. Occasionally the courier brought bulky documents wrapped in a piece of cloth; the couriers would repair together to a theater where, in the darkness, the transfer would be made and the woman would leave. If possible, the agent would then tie the documents around his legs under his loose-fitting trousers and leave; if not, he would simply remain in the theater until it was dark outside. At about 1 AM the agent would deposit the documents in a certain trash can in an alley behind a nearby school; a cab driver would pick them up and pass them on—to whom, the agent did not know. If the documents were Flash mail he would take them directly to the same trash can and, when unobserved, throw them in as though they were trash. Apparently the Saigon agent was aware of the names and appearances not only of the female courier but also of the cab driver and a cyclo driver who sometimes made the pickup from the trash can.⁴⁶

(C) Not all the Courier and Liaison Section stations were located within the Special Zone area; at least one courier came from Tay Ninh to Saigon⁴⁶ and others from towns in adjacent provinces made the run to Ho Bo.⁴⁷

(C) In summary, the Courier and Liaison Section of the Special Zone Committee provided the arteries through which flowed the VC covert traffic in personnel, documents, and supplies. One source document⁴⁸ describes the network as comprising

... many official communications-liaison routes for sensitive areas, and reserve routes so that a [compromised] route is promptly replaced by a new one. Along the routes many stations are built. Each station has a secret base and a weapons cache capable of accommodating from two to three cells with weapons.

Of the agents using cover stories and acting as links in the net, the document states that the group is mostly composed of part-time female agents, without regard to age. Of the primary or terminal way stations, i.e., from the Special Zone Committee itself to principal subordinate elements, the document specifies that "all bases must have fortifications and appropriate measures to secure safety for cadre, forces and visitors. They must also have secret tunnels to conceal weapons."⁴⁶

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Chapter 7

FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC MATTERS

ORGANIZATION

(U) The ability of the VC to cope with the financial and economic challenges that they have faced for many long, lean years is most impressive. It is true that the insurgency receives support from other countries as well as from North Vietnam, but the financial and economic measures required to support the subversive apparatus in the RVN are highly systematized and apparently well implemented.

(C) In the Special Zone the supervision of financial and economic matters has been vested in the Committee's Finance and Economic Section (see Fig. 7). As discussed in a preceding chapter, immediate administration of these matters within the military echelon of the Special Zone has been the responsibility of the Military Affairs Committee's Rear Services Section. Evidence indicates that in 1965 the Central Office for South Vietnam established at each of its subordinate echelons an agency called the Forward Supply Council;⁴⁹ frequent reference has been made to this agency since that time.^{37,50-53} It is the opinion of American intelligence authorities that the Rear Services Sections and Forward Supply Councils deal principally with transporting and supplying military units, whereas "Finance and Economic Sections are primarily responsible for obtaining revenue and supplies [for] the insurgent political and military organizations."⁵⁴ It also would appear that the Forward Supply Council has to do with providing a labor force to support insurgent military and paramilitary operations.^{37,51,55,56} One captured VC document makes it appear that the Finance and Economic Section might now be subordinate to the Forward Supply Council.³⁷

(C) Most data support the thesis that the Finance and Economic Section is primarily concerned with raising revenue. A portion of this revenue is in piasters and a portion in rice equivalents.^{57,58} According to the MACV, 90 percent of the revenue derives from VC taxation, enforced on all segments of the economy in the RVN.⁵⁹⁻⁶¹ A clear distinction between the duties of the Finance and Economy Section and those of the Forward Supply Council cannot be made at this time. In the Special Zone, at least until the end of 1965, financial and economic problems continued to be the province of the Committee's section of that name. No reference has been made to a Special Zone Forward Supply Council in the available raw data and American intelligence authorities in Vietnam indicate doubt about its existence as late as August 1966.⁶²

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FINANCING THE INSURGENCY

(C) To furnish some perspective in the matter of financial requirements in the Special Zone, some dollar figures acquired from captured documents.^{63, 64} are quoted in Table 1, which shows some recurring VC allowances. The rate of exchange used is roughly 120 piasters to the US dollar. These allowances

(C) **TABLE 1**
Some Recurring Individual Allowances Granted Viet Cong
Personnel before March 1966^{63, 64}

Category	Amount/person/month, US dollars
Food allowances	
Up to company commander level	0.45
Battalion executive to regimental commander level	1.50
Senior cadre	1.95
Sick and wounded	
Fortified diet, hospitalized	
Light case	0.99
Serious case	1.98
Critical case	4.00
Fortified diet, convalescent camp	
Light case	0.50
Medium case	0.99
Serious case	1.50
Fortified diet, under care in organization	
Light case	0.03 ^a
Medium case	0.04 ^a
Work allowances	
Health-hazard occupations	0.25
Mental-hazard occupations	0.75
School instructors	0.45
Overtime, at discretion of organization chief	0.25
Pocket-money allowance	
Up to platoon leader level	0.33
Company executive and commander level	0.66
Senior cadre	0.83
Medicine allowance	
Populated areas	0.08
Remote areas (funds held centrally)	0.17
Female allowances	
Female sanitation	0.04
Childbirth, 3-month limit	0.75
Milk for newborn, on monthly medical certification	0.50

^aDaily allowance in excess of 7 days, only by doctor's request.

supplement the basic rice ration, which ranges from about 40 lb/month for cadre in sedentary jobs to about 50 lb/month for combat troops, or their equivalents in piasters.⁶³ Most of the categories shown in Table 1 are self-explanatory; however, three categories need clarification. Work allowances for mental-hazard occupations are apparently paid to personnel whose duties

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require long hours of intellectual effort beyond the norm, such as might be required of cryptographers, key office personnel, and the like; this allowance is probably made to covert operatives as well. The medical allowance in remote areas is allocated on an individual basis but administered centrally by the organization's medical section, which provides the only medical personnel available. The allowance for childbirth is designed to give female members of the apparatus prenatal and postnatal assistance during the time they might be unable to perform their normal duties; by Southeast Asian standards this seems most generous.

(C) In addition to the foregoing, certain articles of clothing and several special items are issued to the military, as discussed earlier in connection with the Rear Services Section of the Military Affairs Committee. Table 1 includes most of the recurring or regular allowances granted to cadre and members of the apparatus and reflects the austerity of VC life. In March 1966 some of these allowances were altered slightly to provide for increases in most categories because of the "... Central Office, South Viet Nam's concern over the living conditions of cadre and troops in spite of its restricted financial resources."⁶⁴

(C) The taxation system that is imposed on the South Vietnamese at the direction of the Central Office is clearly and systematically laid out; its implementation, of course, varies according to the degree of VC control in each area. The Central Office apparently expected, for example, 50 to 60 percent success in collecting taxes from rubber plantations in 1965.⁵³ In the Special Zone the relatively strong VC presence in Cu Chi District would have ensured fairly successful imposition of taxes on the people in that area. In the city of Saigon, tax collection from the merchants was a fruitful effort. Funds collected from Chinese-owned textile mills and export-import firms in the city alone are estimated to have amounted to about \$42,000 per month.⁶⁵

(C) Instructions in the collection of taxes are reminiscent of the American gangsters' protection racket:

Build armed units to collect in cities and towns, . . . [report] people who tried to delay collection, . . . [investigate] the books of businesses, plants, factories and transportation agencies to determine the tax rate; . . . the right number of cadre should be assembled to speed up collection before people get time to conceal the crop harvested.⁵⁸

(C) All forms of transportation were taxed. For example, in 1964 the Special Zone tax rate on wheeled vehicles ranged from \$ 3.30 per month on small private trucks to \$33 per month on lumber trucks. Private automobiles, buses, and so on were taxed at intermediate amounts, depending on the nature of their cargoes and their destinations. Ox carts were required to pay \$2.50 per year. Waterborne-transport taxes varied from \$1.25 per month for boats equipped with motors under 6 hp to \$25 per month for ships with displacement over 12 tons. In one coastal province seagoing ships were taxed at a rate between \$166 and \$417 annually, again depending on cargo and destination.⁶¹

(C) Agricultural taxes derived largely from the staple crop of rice, but plantation owners paid their shares as well. The rubber growers in particular produced a sizable contribution to the insurgents' funds, for VC regulations prescribed that, according to the amount of latex produced, these plantations must pay from \$3.33 to \$1 per acre per year.⁵³ In 1963 a single plantation in

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Long Khan Province paid the VC nearly \$21,000 in taxes.⁶⁰ For the year 1966 the Central Office proposed to increase taxes by as much as 130 percent in some commodities.⁵⁸ The MACV estimates that the insurgents derived some \$720,000 in 1965 and twice that amount in 1966 from taxation of the huge rubber plantations.⁶⁰

(C) Other methods of financing the insurgency have included savings; bond sales; drives whose proceeds were reserved to the province;⁶⁶ fund drives, particularly in areas where taxation could not be successfully imposed or in Saigon, where the VC offer businessmen high interest rates on loans;⁶⁷ and business enterprises conducted by the insurgents themselves.

ECONOMIC SITUATION

(C) Ample evidence indicates that the steady increase in the tempo of the war is causing the VC to feel the pinch in their economic endeavors. Numerous exhortations to accept privation for the sake of the "revolution" are issued by committees at every echelon from Hanoi on down and very specific plans for improvements in the economic situation are promulgated at various levels. One such plan for Binh Duong Province, which reviews the economic situation of 1965, furnishes some interesting information:

In the past year, agricultural production was low due to the danger and hardship caused by the enemy's . . . operations, particularly air raid and artillery shellings; . . . however, the farmers and troops . . . fought bravely to overcome all difficulties and were able to cultivate a large area of [rice] land. . . . Other products such as cassava, potatoes, peanuts, and other crops were slightly increased as compared to previous years. . . . Although the above achievements did not meet the required standard, it was a first step toward success. . . . However, there were a number of weaknesses to overcome. . . .⁵⁸

(C) In planning for improvements in the insurgent economy during the first quarter of 1966, the past performance of the Finance and Economic Section cadre was reviewed and the following weaknesses were pointed out:

(a) The cadre did not understand the problem and needed training in agricultural production and conservation, tax collection, economic requirements of the insurgency, and administrative organization for maximum production.

(b) The cadre failed to instruct farmers in soil preparation, seeding, cultivating, and planning for maximum production.

(c) The cadre failed to supervise the farmers' activities and to follow up.

(d) The cadre failed to propagandize and to motivate the people to supply, willingly, the food needed for the VC. Poor conduct on the part of a few cadresmen alienated the people.

(e) The cadre failed to monitor the activities of greedy merchants through whom some of the supplies for the insurgency had to be bought.

(C) In order to correct these deficiencies, which had adversely affected the growth of the insurgent economy during previous years, detailed guidance was issued to VC personnel who were to be responsible for economic improvements during the first quarter of 1966. First, the cadre were instructed to

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motivate the people in South Vietnam so that they would support the insurgency willingly by increasing their productivity to bolster the VC economy. This was to be accomplished through training the cadre at all levels in pertinent economic and financial matters in order that they be aware of what was needed to motivate the people and to extract full taxes to contribute to economic growth. Some specific steps mentioned in this connection were as follows:

(a) Propagandize the people to secure their emotional and intellectual support for the cause.

(b) Urge the people to compete with the enemy; minimize VC dependence on the enemy economy.

(c) Use the people in helping to disrupt the enemy's blockade of supply routes and storage areas.

(d) Get control of the docks where supplies are unloaded.

(C) In addition to obtaining the people's support through donations, increased productivity, and the increased taxes resulting therefrom, the cadres were instructed to redouble their efforts to collect taxes from skilled laborers and from merchants in the cities. In Binh Duong Province the VC income for 1965 declined 33 percent from their 1964 income. The goal for 1966 was fixed about 14 percent above the goal for 1965; however, there is little likelihood that the 1966 goal was achieved if what happened in 1965 is any criterion. In that year the Binh Duong Finance and Economic Section reported the actual collection of only about 84 percent of what was budgeted.⁵⁸

(C) Detailed information on the economic situation in the Special Zone, if indeed it exists, has not been available. The fact that the city of Saigon lies within the area certainly has affected the level of the VC economy there. Undoubtedly the income from taxation imposed by the Special Zone's Finance and Economic Section on city merchants and workers, farmers, plantation owners, and the like must be well above the average income for other regions. On the other hand, cost to the Special Zone Committee of maintaining the insurgency in an urban milieu is higher than that borne by rural regional committees. A captured VC document⁶⁸ provides some scraps of evidence to support this statement.

(C) In December 1965, a Special Zone agent was apprehended by government security personnel in Cu Chi District with an amount of cash on her person equivalent to nearly half of all the taxes programmed for collection from skilled laborers in Binh Duong Province for all of 1966.

(U) The monthly food allowance for a single city-penetration agent in August and September 1965 was more than double the highest food allowance given to cadre in rural areas. In addition, the city-penetration agent received twice that amount each month for recruiting and travel expenses.

(U) In September 1965 government seizure of three city-penetration agents resulted in a loss of cash and goods in an amount equivalent to the annual tax on a 1250-acre rubber plantation.

(U) These illustrations of the cost of operations in the Special Zone are only isolated examples that can be taken as indicators. The relatively recent exposure and confiscation of huge VC food stores in and around the Special Zone have certainly added to the economic pressure on the insurgents in the area.

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SPECIAL ZONE FINANCE AND ECONOMIC SECTION

(U) Few data have come to light on the organization and detailed operations of the Finance and Economic Section. Its existence as an element in the structure of the Special Zone Committee, however, is affirmed by frequent references to its title and its series of cover numbers (see App B).

(C) In 1964 the Finance and Economic Section was headed by a member of the Special Zone Committee's Standing Group. This man was concurrently the chief of the Civilian Proselyting Section, whose duties were to attract active supporters from the nongovernment sector of the population. The Finance and Economic Section was said to have had a rural affairs branch and an urban affairs branch.⁵ The indications are that the chief of the section and the heads of the two branches, together with a few administrative personnel, maintained an office in that same northern tip of Cu Chi District that sheltered most of the Special Zone Committee leaders. The mission of the section was "to pay the salaries and control the expenditures of the Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone Committee."¹⁷

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Chapter 8

CONCLUSIONS

(U) As a result of this study several conclusions are drawn concerning three major categories: the data, the VC organization in the Special Zone, and the utility of the study to future research and planning.

DATA

(U) From the data search conducted in the US and in Vietnam it is concluded that ample information exists from which a detailed reconstruction of the VC insurgency can be made. The data are, for the most part, in the form of intelligence reports that have outlived their operational utility. Given easy access to these data, the researcher would probably be able to piece together the events that have led to the establishment and survival of the insurgent infrastructure in South Vietnam.

(C) Data to be found in the US repose in the files of the intelligence community. Retrieval of the pertinent information could be a simple process if the researcher were granted access to the existing files of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, AID, and the service intelligence agencies. Simplified administrative procedures would greatly accelerate the pace of research and subsequent analysis. The process would entail minimum perturbation of the intelligence community's workload since the researcher does not need to establish further collection requirements; the information is already in the files and the continued flow established.

(C) Data to be found in Vietnam are contained in the files of the Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, the RVN Joint General Staff, and the National Police. In order to retrieve pertinent data from American sources in Vietnam, the researcher must be familiar with the output of the several interrogation centers, the Combined Document Exploitation Center, and the service collection agencies; he must enjoy access to the appropriate elements supervised by the MACV and the US Embassy; all this information, in one form or another, reaches Washington. In order to retrieve pertinent data from the government of the RVN the researcher must be allowed to establish rapport, through appropriate channels, with intelligence agencies of the High Command, the Special Branch of the National Police, and the Vietnamese component of the Combined Document Exploitation Center. Retrieval of data from Vietnamese files requires linguistic

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ability in Vietnamese and French and infinite patience with the filing system--if indeed there is a system. Data from other sources in Vietnam are obtainable from French, British, and nongovernment Vietnamese, given the necessary degree of personal rapport between researcher and source.

(U) Although no data were collected from sources other than those mentioned, there is evidence that valuable information can be found among the records of the French and British governments. If a balanced data base is to be built for the early phases of the VC apparatus, the researcher must have access to these records.

(U) Large blocks of the data required in a study of this sort lend themselves to manipulation by machine processing. The most promising areas for initiation of automatic data processing include cover designations and biographic information.

(U) It is not possible to produce a detailed analysis of the early stages in the evolution of the Special Zone infrastructure without access to information in the Vietnamese language. Most reports in the English language contain little information pertaining to the period before 1960.

VIET CONG ORGANIZATION IN THE SPECIAL ZONE

(U) It is clear that the Special Zone's VC infrastructure had its origins in the Viet Minh stay-behind cadres and that key posts in the organization were filled by professional organizers who received their training from the Communist Party in North Vietnam and elsewhere.

(U) The control echelons of the Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone Committee were headquartered in rural areas and handled activities in the urban centers as field operations. The small VC apparatus in the area relied little on outside assistance for logistic and financial support; it used persuasion and coercion, as circumstances dictated, to acquire food, clothing, medicines, and money from the South Vietnamese people who lived within the Special Zone.

(U) From its inception the Special Zone Committee has relied heavily on a few trusted persons. Generally speaking, these men and women were South Vietnamese who went north in 1954 and received 5 or 6 years of training and indoctrination before their infiltration back into South Vietnam and assignment to posts in the Special Zone. Many key personnel filled two or more assignments on the Special Zone Committee staff.

(U) At least until 1966 the Central Office for South Vietnam maintained close supervision over the Special Zone Committee. Despite the military complexion of the VC, few major decisions are made by persons whose only titles are military. Little initiative is left to the lower-echelon leaders.

(U) All the evidence derived from data on the Special Zone indicates that the organizational pattern at each level--province, district, village, and hamlet--followed the pattern set by the Central Office and the Special Zone Committee.

(U) All evidence considered in this study indicates that the NFLSVN is a propaganda organization devoted to enlisting the sympathy of the South Vietnamese and the outside world. Its aims and policies are directed and formulated by the Communist Party, whose objective is to unite the north and the south under the control of the current leadership in Hanoi.

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UTILITY TO FUTURE RESEARCH

(U) From a detailed analysis of the data available, patterns and trends in the evolution of a major control element in the VC apparatus have been ascertained. These generalities involve the problems of span of control, supply, and financing in an insurgent movement in a remote area. An expanded treatment of the VC experience, embracing analyses of the other regions subordinate to the Central Office for South Vietnam, should produce a better understanding of the key relations and ingredients in low-intensity warfare such as: (a) early recognition of the true nature of front organizations; (b) early identification of sources of potential internal conflict, such as that which may well exist between northern-trained cadre and stay-behind cadre; and (c) the penetration potential inherent in the politico-military training programs required to ensure the solidarity of the insurgent effort.

(U) The methods involved in establishing a computerized data base are useful now for data already collected and are pertinent to systems for the improvement of future data collection.

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Appendix A

A COMPUTER PROGRAM FOR RETRIEVAL OF BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

INTRODUCTION

(U) This appendix contains a description of RAC computer programs available for the study of VC personalities in the Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone and a sample listing of key personalities associated with the organizations discussed in the body of the report.

(U) The program outline, prepared by the RAC Computer Sciences Center, describes preliminary efforts to program a retrieval system for data pertaining to more than 1000 Special Zone personalities. These data, in the form of about 12,000 punched cards, were furnished by the MACV. In addition the data base contains information collected by RAC on approximately 2000 Special Zone personalities. In some cases the data are duplicative, in others they are substantiating, and in still others they are supplementary.

(U) Table A1 lists an edited program response to a requirement to retrieve all data on personalities whose positions in the Special Zone Committee structure would entitle them to be called "key personnel." Names and accompanying biographic data are listed in the order in which their parent organizations are discussed in the body of the report, with some names listed more than once as occupying different positions. Every effort has been made to edit the listing for errors in interpretation of the data; consequently the listing is believed to be a relatively accurate reflection of the true situation.

PROGRAMS AVAILABLE FOR STUDY OF VIET CONG PERSONALITIES

Description of Individual Program Function

(U) The present programs consist of questioning each VC personality to see if he meets any or all the selective conditions requested. Three programs are being used to record and retrieve the desired information.

(U) Program I: Tape-to-Tape. This program will sequence-check the category and card sequence within a category and group-check the MACV or RAC identification number for each personality. A hard-copy error message will be given for each error condition. The card causing the error will be bypassed.

(U) The name is placed on magnetic tape in the prescribed output format and all other information for this personality is appended after the name.

(U) Program II: SORT. The program will alphabetically sequence all personalities by the appended name. This may be done by using the OPTION EQUALS card that is included in the control cards for this program.

(U) Program III: Information Retrieval. This program will store the selective-condition requests. The requests must contain the category(s) number and the word(s) of interest for selection. The requirements of the leader card, which contains the title for a run and the number of requests, must be met before a personality will be selected.

(U) Each personality category, numbered from 010-180, is read and stored in the computer; the program will check for the selective condition that has been stated and, after the number of desired selective conditions is equal to or greater than the number of requests, a hard copy of the information on that personality will be made.

User Instruction

(U) Program I: Tape-to-Tape. Input—a magnetic tape has been generated by the 7044 IN program. Block size is 900 characters. Record length is 90 characters, including the control word, as shown in the accompanying tabulation.

Position	Function
1-6	Control word
7-15	MACV or RAC identification code
16-46	Document information
47-79	Category information
80-82	Category number
83-84	Region code
85-86	Category card sequence
87-90	Blank

(U) Output—the data generated by 7044 IN will be placed on another magnetic tape in the following manner: block size will be 1200 characters; record length will be 120 characters, including the control word, as shown in the accompanying tabulation.

Position	Function	Comments
1-6	Control word	
7-39	Personality name	This name will be present on all records with information pertaining to that personality
40-119	Contains the information found in positions 7-90 of the 7044 IN data	

(U) Program II: SORT. Input—there are no input cards for this program. Only the magnetic tape generated by Program I will be input.

(U) Output—information generated by Program I is sorted alphabetically by name. Block size will be 1200 characters. Record length will be 120 characters, including the control word.

(U) Program III: Information Retrieval. Input—to operate the program, the user must specify his requirements on a series of either control or data cards. The control cards specify that the next cards will contain the selected conditions for comparison or that the program is to start execution. The data cards contain the selected condition for comparison and retrieval. Control cards have a 2-digit control number punched in cols 1 and 2 of each card. The control numbers used and the meaning of each are as follows:

01—Type data cards follow
99—End of data (begin processing)

Control type 01 will also contain the information shown in the accompanying tabulation.

Control card	Function	Comments
3-4	Number of comparisons to be satisfied	If blank, will be converted to 01; if a code 99 no comparisons will be made and all personalities will be listed
5-80	Title for a run	Any alphanumeric characters are acceptable

Data Cards

Control type 01 data give the selective conditions requested for a personality, in the following card format.

Control card	Function	Comments
1-2	Blank	
3-5	Category to be selected	May be any category from 010-161
6-38	Selected condition	May be any alphanumeric characters for form word(s) related to that category Note: multiple words must be continued

(U) Output—a copy will be given of the following data:

- (a) Title for a run (this will appear on every page of output)
- (b) Number of comparison tests to be made
- (c) The category and selective conditions requested
- (d) Any personality with all information pertaining to him which meets the conditions set forth in b and c

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TABLE A1

Biographical Sketches of Some Key Viet Cong Personalities in the Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh Special Zone Structure

Subordinate organization	Real name	Pseudonym	Biographical data
Special Zone Committee			
	Nguyen Tron Dan	Chin Dung	Chairman, 1962-1965; used his pseudonym until mid-1964
	Le Toan Thu	Bay Binh	Deputy chairman, 1962-1965; infiltrated Saigon in Oct 63 and was still there in late 1964, but left every 1-2 months; in addition, was in charge of guiding the team for propagandizing and leading the student groups in the Capital
	—	Tu Ho	Deputy chairman; killed in 1960 and replaced by Le Toan Thu
	Nguyen Ngoc Thanh	Tam To	Arrested in 1959 and sentenced to a 15-year term on Con Dao Island; at some point was executive secretary
	—	Ba K Ba Khue	Resident of Cu Chi District; in 1964 was a member of the committee responsible for proselyting and leading covert activities in the first Borough of Saigon until his activities were uncovered
	—	Chin Bien Chin Ca Chin K	Member 1962-1964; infiltrated Saigon in Oct 63 but left once every 1-2 months; main duties were leading and proselyting workers in the city
	—	Nam Nhut Nam Non Nam Son	Cadre of the Standing Group 1962-1963; in 1964 was an official of the Secretariat and held a position in Rear Services Section of Military Affairs Committee; native of South Vietnam; infiltrated the Capital in Oct 64
	Nguyen Tan Hoang	—	One of Standing Group cadre, late 1965
	Nguyen Van Thu	Nam Thu	Born North Vietnam 1924; late in 1965 was a member of Standing Group cadre in Special Zone; held positions in Military Affairs Committee and Military Proselyting Section
	—	Tu Anh	Official of Standing Group, date unknown
	Le Van Tan	Bay Nhon	Cited in Feb 66 as chief of Secretariat; arrested late in 1958 and imprisoned on Con Dao Island
	—	Nguyen Tien	Late in 1965 was identified as chief of Secretariat
	Nguyen Nhu Trinh	Hai Phong Minh Thuyet	From 1962-1966 was chief of Secretariat
	—	Tu Hiep	Born in North Vietnam 1929; infiltrated the city of Saigon; in 1963 cited as deputy chief of Secretariat; from 1961-1964 was a permanent cadre of Saigon city committee, in charge of the various boroughs
	—	Chin Le	Member of Secretariat cadre; probably around 1964, was responsible for conducting research on student groups and activities in Special Zone Area for the VC

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TABLE A1 (continued)

Subordinate organization	Real name	Pseudonym	Biographical data
Special Zone Committee			
	—	Hai Thai	Another research cadre of Secretariat; in mid-1964 reported injured in bombing raid
	—	Muoi Viet	Cadre of Secretariat in 1964; in charge of "studying reports"
	—	Nam Bac	Born North Vietnam 1926; (she) infiltrated Saigon late in 1924 (?); was instructor for Saigon city cadre; 1962 became member of the Secretariat and led various VC operations in the city
Southern Province Committee			
Nha Be District Committee	—	Tam Bai	Member of the Special Zone Committee; in 1962 was responsible for rural affairs; in late 1964 reported as chief of VC operations in Nha Be and Thu Duc Districts
	—	Tam Hai	Head of Nha Be (Binh Chanh) District Committee, date unknown
Thu Duc District Committee	—	Ba Binh	From 1963-1964 was chief of Thu Duc District Committee; prominent VC military person in Special Zone
	—	Bay Xi	Formerly in charge of military intelligence; at some date was reported as head of Thu Duc District Committee
	—	Binh Hai Dong	Late in 1964 was in charge of Thu Duc District Committee
	—	Hai Bung	In charge of Thu Duc Committee, date unknown; former resistance member
	—	Hai Thanh	Identified late in 1966 as head of Thu Duc District Committee
	—	Nam Ly	Head of Thu Duc Committee, date unknown
	—	Tam Bai	See Nha Be District Committee
Capital City Committee			
	—	Ba Phuong Sau Tri	Chairman of Saigon city committee from 1961; infiltrated Capital, was trained by the Central Office at their Nguyen Ai Quoc School; late in 1963 was captured by RVN authorities
	Bui Van Giap	Muoi Duc	In 1962 was one of cadre in charge of city activities in Saigon
Boroughs I and III	—	Sau Tan	South Vietnamese, infiltrated Saigon; was in charge of first and third Boroughs of Saigon sometime before 1965
(1) Borough I Committee	—	Ba K	See Special Zone Committee
	—	Ba Khue	
	—	Tien	Cited as head of first Borough of Saigon in 1965
	Tran Van Khe	Le Van Nhu	Born in Go Vap District, Gia Dinh Province

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TABLE A1 (continued)

Subordinate organization	Real name	Pseudonym	Biographical data
Boroughs II and IV Committee	—	Cao Hoa	in 1917; arrested Nov 58, released in 1964; trained by VC, assumed several positions in cadre; in 1964 was chief of Saigon Borough I Committee under pseudonym Le Van Nhu; also in charge of troop and worker proselyting from Mar-Sep 64
		Bay Cao	
		Nghiep	
		Phong Van	
Boroughs II and IV Committee	—	Hai Cac	Arrested in Saigon, imprisoned for 4 years; rejoined VC on release in 1961; worked for Capital City Committee in Boroughs II and IV; in 1963, after completion of Central Office information and press training course, returned to Boroughs II and IV Committee as chief until late 1964
		Nam Oai	Born in South Vietnam in 1926; infiltrated Saigon in 1961, attended Central Office training course at Nguyen Ai Quoc School in 1962, was captured late in 1963; from 1961-1963 was chief of Boroughs II and IV Committee in Saigon and alternate member of the Special Zone Committee
		Nam Cai	
	—	Sau Hoang	Wife of committee chief, Nam Oai; might have been his assistant in 1961; in 1964 was cited as deputy chief of Boroughs II and IV Committee; born in 1928, native of South Vietnam
	Le Van Tien	Le Trung	In late 1964 was identified as political officer of Boroughs II and IV Committee cadre in Saigon
		Le Trung Hai	
(a) Borough IV	—	Quang	Secretary of Borough IV in Saigon in 1965; sentenced to hard labor on Con Dao Island
Boroughs VII and VIII Committee	—	Ba Dat	Late in 1964 was a cadre of Boroughs VII and VIII Committee, in charge of propaganda and training
		Tu Dat	
		Hai Sang	Alternate member of the Special Zone Committee operating secretly in Saigon; in charge of Boroughs VII and VIII, 1964
Boroughs V and VI Committee	—	Sau Trinh	Deputy chief of Boroughs V and VI, 1964
Northern Province Party Committee			
Go Mon District Committee	Nguyen Van Nghia	Tam Nghia	In 1964 reported to be in charge of Go Mon District Committee
	Nguyen Van Suoc	Le Trung Nghia	Chief of the Go Vap-Hoc Mon District Committees early in 1966
	Vo Van Boi	Ba Dai	Chief of Go Vap District Committee, date unknown; attended a 6-month Communist prosecution (sic) training course
	Nguyen Van He	—	In 1965 was deputy chief of Go Vap District Committee
	Tran Van Ma	Cong Minh	Chief of Hoc Mon District Committee; in charge of civilian proselyting 1961-1964

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TABLE A1 (continued)

Subordinate organization	Real name	Pseudonym	Biographical data
Cu Chi District Committee	—	Ut Son	Born in Cu Chi District in 1924; resided in Xom Moi Base area of Special Zone; from 1962–1966 (?) was chairman of the Cu Chi District Committee
	—	Mot Son	Alternate member of the Special Zone Committee; chairman of Cu Chi District Committee late in 1964
Military Affairs Committee			
Operations Section	—	Hai Phung	Colonel; in Dec 61, arrived in Special Zone to take charge of cadre for Military Affairs Committee; in 1965 still cited as its chief
	—	Hai Hung	Possibly a pseudonym or misspelling of Hai Phung; in Jul 64 identified as chief of Military Affairs Committee
	—	Sau Ky	In 1964 identified as deputy chief of Military Affairs Committee
	—	Nam	Date unknown, cited as chief of staff (possibly of Operations Section) in Special Zone, while residing in Cu Chi District
	—	Bay Nam	Born 1924; probably head of Operations Section 1964–1966 with military rank of major
	—	Ba Hai	In mid-1965 was deputy chief of Operations Section
	—	Hai Nhi	Senior captain, returned to RVN in Aug 61; transferred to Saigon Task Force Command as training and study assistant; 1964 replaced by Tu Tien; became deputy chief of Military Affairs Operations Section
	Tran Van Sau	Tran Hong Ky Tran Kien Tran Van Luc	Born 1929; infiltrated South Vietnam Aug 61; in 1964 joined Communist Party; in 1963 assigned to Operations Section; early in 1964 identified as its deputy chief
	—	Ba Tien	Senior lieutenant; returned to South Vietnam Aug 61; held positions of ordnance officer, chief of armed forces in Xom Bung, and deputy chief of Military Personnel Section; became chief of Operations Section's administrative detachment in 1965
	—	Bay Tot	In May 65 cited as chief of administrative detachment
(a) Signal detachment	—	Ut Sang	Identified as administrative detachment chief in Jul 64
	—	Tu Quan Bay Tho	Chief of signal detachment, date unknown Early in 1964 was chief either of cipher cell or cryptographic section of signal detachment
(b) Cartographic detachment	—	Long	Educated at secondary-school level in South Vietnam; in 1964 was chief of cartographic detachment of the Military Affairs Committee

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TABLE A1 (continued)

Subordinate organization	Real name	Pseudonym	Biographical data
(c) Recruit detachment	—	Ba Choi Hai Hai Choi Hai Chon Hai Nhon	Chief of recruit detachment from 1962–1964
	—	—	In May 65 was chief, Military Personnel Section, probably recruit detachment
	—	Nam Thanh	Chief of recruit detachment in Jul 64; also minor official in Propaganda and Training Section; in 1966 was on Special Zone Standing Committee
	—	Ba Dung	Identified in 1964 as deputy chief of recruit detachment's Recruit Reception Center
	—	Nam Dung	In Jul 64 was chief of Recruit Detachment's Training Section
	—	Nam Binh	In 1964 was superintendent of New Recruits' Training Center
	—	Ut Lia	In early 1964 was chief of Training Center's Military Political School and head of its office staff
	—	Ba Ong	Assistant chief of Military Political School in Recruit Training Center
(d) Intelligence detachment	—	Bach	In Jul 64 was chief of headquarters section of military intelligence detachment
	Le Hy Quang	Tu Om Tu Minh Le Hi Quang	Holding various positions in Military Affairs Committee: head of quartermaster section, instructor, commander of various military sections; from 1961–1965 was chief of military intelligence detachment of Special Zone; also was member of cadres for propaganda and proselyting activities
	—	Tu Dat	Chief of military intelligence detachment in Special Zone Dec 64; also, in 1963, a commander in Saigon Task Force Command, a deputy chief of Security Section, and deputy chief of Political Affairs Section
	—	Sau Huynh	Deputy chief of intelligence detachment, date unknown
	—	Tam Thanh	VC captain; returned to RVN early in 1962; in 1964 became one of Le Hy Quang's assistants in military intelligence detachment, helped Tu Dat set up Capital Research Section
	Tran Van Nhi	Ba Ba	Member of intelligence detachment cadre; born in Tay Ninh Province in 1929; joined VC in May 61 as clerk in military intelligence detachment; from May 61–Nov 62 was in charge of its permanent office; from Dec 62–Feb 63 trained female commo-liasion agents, headed Saigon city operations until captured in 1963
	—	Nam Gia	Chief of combat-readiness detachment in 1964; also headed food unit of quartermaster detachment, Rear Services Section
(e) Combat-readiness detachment	—	Nam Gia	Chief of combat-readiness detachment in 1964; also headed food unit of quartermaster detachment, Rear Services Section

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TABLE A1 (continued)

Subordinate organization	Real name	Pseudonym	Biographical data
Political Affairs Section	—	Tu Quy	Born early 1920's; regrouped to DRVN; in Aug 61 returned to RVN to form Special Zone Military Affairs Committee; by 1963 had assumed position of chief of its Political Affairs Section, remained in that position through 1964; also helped Tu Dat set up capital research section, commanded special action units in Saigon, was member of Special Zone Committee
	Le Van Kiet	Sau Van Chanh Do Quyet	In Oct 63 was chief of Political Affairs Section in Special Zone
	—	Tu Dat	See military intelligence detachment
(a) Security officer	—	Bay Dung Hai Bong	Chief of Security Section of Military Affairs Committee in 1965; in Sep 65 his name was officially changed to Hai Bong
(b) Party organization officer	—	Tam Hong	Regrouped from North Vietnam in Apr 62; in mid-1966 was party organization officer of Military Affairs Committee
(c) Political education officer	—	Bay Huyen	Cadre in Political Affairs Section in charge of training
Rear Services Section	—	Hien Luu Quang	In Apr 65 identified as chief of Rear Services Section
	Le Duc Hien	Duong	Chief of Rear Services Section, date unknown; involved in several sabotage plans in Saigon; possibly commanded planting of a bomb at Cong Ly bridge in May 65
	—	Sau Tinh	Chief of Rear Services Section Mar 64—Jul 65
(a) Quartermaster detachment	Le Hy Quang	Tu Om Tu Minh Le Hi Quang	See intelligence detachment
	—	Tu Lang Loi	In Jul 64, head of quartermaster detachment
	—	Nam Gia	See combat readiness detachment
(b) Medical detachment	—	Bon Vu	In Jul 64 was chief of medical detachment of Rear Services Section
	—	Dr. Tu Vu	Born in 1924; after regrouping to DRVN, returned to RVN; in 1964 was chief of medical detachment
	—	Tam Doan	Medical technician, in 1965 was assistant chief of military medical detachment
Propaganda and Indoctrination Section			
	—	Ba Huong	Chief of Propaganda and Indoctrination Section 1964–1966; resided in Ho Bo Hamlet
	Dao Huynh Long	Trung Truc	Early in 1966 was cited as possible chief of Propaganda and Indoctrination Section
	—	Hai Nghiem	Chief of Propaganda and Indoctrination Section, Jul 64

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TABLE A1 (continued)

Subordinate organization	Real name	Pseudonym	Biographical data
—	—	Hai Tam	Member of the Special Zone Committee; infiltrated South Vietnam in Oct 64, became chief of Propaganda and Indoctrination Section
Le Van Dot	—	Tu Ha Tu Hien	Chief of Propaganda and Indoctrination Section in 1962, was in charge of writing news bulletins and propaganda leaflets in Chinese; in 1966, cited as a deputy chief of this section; civilian life worked as accounting clerk for commercial firm in Cholon
—	—	Muoi Hung	In 1964 (?) was chief of Propaganda Section and member of propaganda cadre for entertainment
—	—	Nam Xuan	Late in 1964 was chief of Propaganda and Indoctrination Section and commander of Binh Tan local forces
—	—	Ut Nam Vu Tung	Active as journalist in NFLSVN and in propaganda operations in Special Zone; at some point chief of Propaganda and Indoctrination Section, while holding office in its information and press branch in 1964
—	—	Ba Huang	In Jul 64 was deputy chief of Propaganda and Indoctrination Section
—	—	Bay An	Assistant chief of Propaganda and Indoctrination Section, in charge of rural training, date unknown
—	—	Hai Tang	In Jul 64 was chief of Propaganda and Indoctrination Section's administration and supply element
—	—	Muoi Lien	In 1964 was also chief of Propaganda and Indoctrination Section's administration element
—	—	Sau Hoa	In Jul 64 was another chief of administration element
—	—	Ba Ton	Chief of training and indoctrination element of Propaganda and Indoctrination Section in 1962; infiltrated Saigon in 1964; head of Borough I and III Committee; head of training for Capital City Committee, chief of Borough V and VI Committee in 1963; from 1962 alternate member of the Special Zone Committee
—	—	Hai Phat	In Jul 64 was identified as chief of training and indoctrination element of Propaganda and Indoctrination Section
—	—	Muoi Tam	Chief of Tan Dinh propaganda network; in 1963 was discovered and transferred to training and indoctrination element as assistant chief; sometimes returned to Tan Dinh area on missions
—	—	Tu Hoa	Former chief of Tay Ninh Propaganda and Indoctrination Section; later became chief

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(C) TABLE A1 (continued)

Subordinate organization	Real name	Pseudonym	Biographical data
			of Special Zone Committee's training and indoctrination element in Propaganda and Indoctrination Section
	—	Ba Ly	In 1961 (?) was commander of Political Re-education School in training and indoctrination element
	—	Nam Ba	Chief of city propaganda net in Operations element of Propaganda and Indoctrination Section, (she) infiltrated Saigon in Oct 64; in 1961 was an instructor for city propaganda cadre and in 1962 a member of Secretariat; assigned to Saigon Borough I Committee at the time of its establishment in Sep 64 (?); believed to have been imprisoned in Saigon at some unknown date
Organization Section			
	—	Ut Mot	In 1964 was chief of Organization Section and secretary of its administrative subsection
	—	Ut Kiet	Deputy chief of Organization Section, involved in its administrative subsection
	—	Sau Khiem	Head of Civilian Proselyting Section in charge of city activities 1961-1964; also chief of Finance-Economy Section in 1964, and member of the Special Zone Standing Committee in charge of Northern and Southern Provinces; in 1965 was chief of Organization Section
	—	Ba Tu	Chief of rural branch of Military Proselyting Section; transferred to Organization Section and from 1964-Dec 65 was chief of its cadre subsection
	—	Tu Hai	Member of the Special Zone Standing Committee and city Organization Section in 1965; assigned to cadre subsection, also became chief of statistics subsection
	—	Nam Binh	See Military Affairs Committee's Operations Section
Security Section			
	—	Nam Tan	In Dec 64 was chief of Security Section and alternate member of the Special Zone Committee
Le Van Tam		Tu Hung Hung Le Minh	Born in 1924; in 1964 chief of Security Section and political officer in Military Affairs Committee
Nguyen Cong Tam		Nguyen Thanh Phong Tan Phong	Major; party chapter secretary; in early 1966 identified as commander in the Security Section
	—	Ba Long	In 1964 was deputy chief of urban affairs in Security Section
	—	Muoi Phuoc	In 1964 deputy chief of Security Section, in charge of Area B (?)

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(C)

TABLE A1 (continued)

Subordinate organization	Real name	Pseudonym	Biographical data
	—	Tam Phong	In 1964 deputy chief of rural affairs in the Security Section
		Courier and Liaison Section	
	—	Hai Binh	Born in 1929; residing in Binh Duong; from late 1964 to early 1966 was chief of Courier and Liaison Section
	—	U! Thanh	Chief of Courier and Liaison Section, date unknown; operated in Loc Thuan forest, was in charge of guiding cadre between Special Zone Committee and Central Office for South Vietnam
Nguyen Van Dinh		Tu De Ninh Tra	Political officer and assistant platoon leader of Courier and Liaison Section in 1965
		Finance and Economic Section	
Nguyen Hong Trao		—	Born in Phu Hoa District in 1931; was chief of provision subsection of Forward Supply Council
Chin Bien		—	Date unknown, was chief of Finance and Economic Section and chief of Propaganda and Indoctrination Section
	—	Chin Ha	Chief of Finance and Economic Section of Special Zone in late 1964; also cited as one of two deputy chiefs of same section in 1964
Huynh Van Hoa		—	Residing in Hau Nghia Province; at an unknown date was chief of Finance and Economic Section
	—	Ba Dai Decoux	In Dec 64 was deputy chief of Finance and Economic Section
	—	Ba	Date unknown, was chief of urban affairs branch of Finance and Economic Section
	—	Tam Gia	In 1964 was member of Finance and Economic Section in charge of urban affairs
	—	Tu Son	In 1964 was also a member of Finance and Economic Section in charge of urban affairs
	—	Hai Anh	Formerly village cadre from Phu Hoa Dong, was transferred to Military Intelligence Bureau, and from Oct 61—Jul 62 received on-the-job training; by 1964 was chief of rural affairs branch of Finance and Economic Section and chief cadre of city propaganda activities
	—	Hai Den	In 1964 was chief of rural affairs branch of Finance and Economic Section of Special Zone
	—	Tu Nuoc	Date unknown, was cadre in charge of rural affairs in Finance and Economic Section
Phan Van Rang		Phan Hoai Giang Phan Trung	Identified in early 1966 as chief of administrative staff for Finance and Economic Section

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Appendix B

SOME COVER DESIGNATIONS ATTRIBUTED TO VIET CONG AGENCIES IN THE SAIGON-GIA DINH SPECIAL ZONE (By organizational structure)^{4-6,9,10,12-17,19,21,24,25,36,48,69-80}

Element	Designation	Date	Reference
Committee, Special Zone	I.4	1960-late 1962	-a
	Y.4	Jul 62	69
	T.4	1963	-a
Standing Group, Secretariat	TK.2495	1962	5
	A.65	1963-1964	5,9,10,70
	D.20	Early 1964	5
	Anh Cong	Jun 64-Jun 65	5,69
	D.300	Jun 64-Jun 65	5,13,17,69
	N.405	Before 1 Jun 65	13,69
	Y.700	1 Jun 65	13,69
	Anh Tien	Sep 65	71
Subordinate committees			
(a) Southern Province			
(1) Nha Be District	U.62	Early 1964	5
	U.61	1964	9,69
	V.1-V.7	1964	9,69
	D.101	-b	69
	HK.2054	1964	69
	HK.2654	1964	9,69
	H.84	Feb 64-1965	6,9,16,69,72
	AH.5064	Jul 64	69
	FK.211	Jul 64	69
	Z.204	Jul 64	69
	C.424	1965-1 Jun 65	13,17,72
	PH.101	1965-1 Jun 65	13,73
	R.629	Before 1 Jun 65	13
	Z.59	1 Jun 65	13
	AH.5071	-b	69
	D.105	-b	69
	L.1	-b	69
	Z.210	-b	69
	H.90	1964	6,9,16,69
	HK 2670	1964	9,69
(2) Thu Duc District	C.425	Before 1 Jun 65	13,17,72
	R 630	Before 1 Jun 65	13
	Z.55	1 Jun 65	13
	A.535	Dec 1964-1965	5,13,17,69
	PH.106	Mar-1 Jun 65	13,73
(b) Capital City			
(1) Boroughs I and III			
	Q.805	Before 1 Jun 65	13,69

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Element	Designation	Date	Reference
a) Borough I	A.539	Aug 64	17,69
	507A	Before Oct 64	6,36
	Q.807	Oct 64	6,36
b) Borough III	507B	Before Oct 64	36
	A.536	Dec 1964-1965	5,13,17,69
	PH.107	Mar-1 Jun 65	13,73
(2) Boroughs II and IV	Tu Hai	Before 1 Jun 65	13
	Q.806	Before 1 Jun 65	13,69
	A.537	Dec 1964-1965	5,13,69
(3) Boroughs VII and VIII	PH.104	Mar-1 Jun 65	13,73
	Q.807	Before 1 Jun 65	13,69
	PH.105	Mar-1 Jun 65	13,73
(4) Boroughs V and VI	A.538	Before 1 Jun 65	5,17,69
	Q.808	Before 1 Jun 65	13,69
	U.60	1964	9,17,69
(c) Northern Province	H.92	1964	6,9,10,16
	HK.2672	1964	9,69
	AH.5070	Jul 64	69
(1) Di An District	FK.218	Jul 64	69
	Z.212	Jul 64	69
	C.420	1965-1 Jun 65	13,17,72
	PH.202	Mar-1 Jun 65	13,73
	B.625	Before 1 Jun 65	13
	Z.56	1 Jun 65	13
	C.46	Aug 65	74
	Anh Nong	Aug 65	74
	106	-b	69
(2) Cu Chi District	H.94	1964	6,9,16
	HK.2674	1964	9,69
	AH.5072	Jul 64	69
	H.84	Jul 64	10,69
	Z.214	Jul 64	69
	C.423	1965-1 Jun 65	13,17,72
	C.422	Mar 65	72
	R.628	Before 1 Jun 65	13
	Z.60	1 Jun 65	13
(3) Go Mon District	AH.5068	-b	69
	D.107	-b	69
	FK.215	-b	69
	C.30	1964	69
	C.31	1964	69
	C.32	1964	69
	H.88	1964	6,9,10,16,69
	HK.2658	1964	9,69
	AH.5063	Jul 64	69
	C.422	1965-1 Jun 65	13,24,72
	C.421	Mar 65	72
	PH.201	Mar-1 Jun 65	13,73
	R.627	Before 1 Jun 65	13
	Z.57	1 Jun 65	13
	D.102	-b	69
(4) Binh Tan District	H.86	1964	9,10,16,69
	HK.2656	1964	69
	HK.5066	1964	69
	FK.213	Jul 64	69
	Z.206	Jul 64	69

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Element	Designation	Date	Reference
Military Affairs Committee	C.421	1965-1 Jun 65	13
	PH.102	1965-1 Jun 65	13,73
	R.626	Before 1 Jun 65	13
	Z.58	1 Jun 65	13
	C.423	1965	72
	D.305	-b	13
	N.402	-b	75
	C.306	Dec 61	16,69,72
	Group 46	1962	16
	TK.2496	1963	6,9,16,69
	D.301	1964	17,74,72
	A.66	Jul 63-1964	-a
	PH.42	1965	14
	N.406	Before Jun 65	13,69,76
(a) Operations Section, administrative detachment	Y.60	1 Jun 65	-a
	Doi 40	-b	69
	C.14	1964	69
	B.1	Mar 64	16
	B.10	1964-1965	6,9,16,69,72
	(1) Signal detachment	-b	75
	F.25	1965	75
	24C/42C	1965	75
	G.50	1965	4,75
	(2) Cartographic detachment	B.30	1964
	(3) Recruit detachment		
	a) Recruit Reception Center	K.16	Dec 61-Mar 65
		L.86	1964-1965
		C.216	1964
(b) Political Affairs Section		Q.10	-b
	b) Recruit Training Center	B.71	-b
		D.71	-b
		K.19	Dec 61-Aug 63
		L.89	Aug 63-1965
		C.219	1964
		C.916	1964
		Q.466	1964
		F.19	1963-1965
	(4) Intelligence detachment	K.15	1961-1963
		L.85	1963-1965
		B.15	1964
		Q.465	1964
	(5) Combat Readiness detachment	A1/B1	1964
(c) Rear Services Section		-b	69
	Anh Tam	Oct 63	70
	C.15	1964	69
	B.2	1964	6,16
	B.20	1964-1965	69
	(1) Security Officer	B.60	1964-1965
		B.4	1964
		FE.60	Jul 64
		B.40	Feb 64-1965
		B.50	-b
	(1) Quartermaster detachment	Q.463	Jul 64
		K.13	Feb 64-1965
		L.83	Feb 64-1965

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Element	Designation	Date	Reference
(2) Medical detachment	K.12	Feb 63-1964	6,9,16,69,72,78
	L.82	Feb 64-1965	6,9,16,69,72
	Q.462	Jul 64	69
	C.212	1964-1965	25,75
	F.12	20 Jan 65	75
(3) Ordnance detachment	K.11	1963-1965	6,9,69,72
	L.81	1964-1965	6,9,69,72
	Q.461	1964	69
Propaganda and Indoctrination Section	C.306	-b	69
	C.310	-b	69
	D.506	-b	69
	D.306	Sep 61	79
	TK.2497	1961-Jul 64	5,69
	D.302	1962-1 Jun 65	5,13,17,69
	A.67	1964	5,10,69,70
	C.307	1964	69
	N.407	Before 1 Jan 65	5,13,69
	Y.61	1 Jun 65	12,13
	C.15	1963-1964	70
	K.48	1961-Dec 64	19,69
(a) Training and Indoctrination Political reeducation school			
(b) Operations (1) Urban (2) Rural Organization Section	U.22	1964	5
	U.64	1964	5
	A.74	1964	9,10,69,70
	TK.2544	1964	9,10,69,70
	D.303	1964	5,13,17,69
	C.314	Jul 64	69
	N.408	1964-1 Jun 65	13,69
	Y.62	1 Jun 65	13
	K.10	1965-1966	48,80
	A.71	1964	9,10,69,70
	TK.2541	1964	9,10,69,70
	D.304	1964	5,12,13,17,69
	N.409	1964-1965	13,69
	Y.63	1 Jun 65	12,13
	D.308	Jul 63	69
Security Section	A.73	1964	9,69,70
	TK.2543	1964	9,69
	C.313	Jul 64	69
	D.311	1964-1965	13,69
	N.415	1965	13,69
	Y.67	1 Jun 65	13
	C.315	-b	69
	A.10	1964	69
	B.215	1964	69
	C.34	1964	69
	D.307	1964	5,17
	A.75	1964	9,10,69,70
	TK.2545	May, Jul 64	69
	D.308	1965-1 Jun 65	12,13
	N.413	1965-1 Jun 65	12,13,73
Intelligence Section	Y.66	1 Jun 65	12,13,48
Courier and Liaison Section			


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Element	Designation	Date	Reference
Finance and Economic Section	D.306	1964	17
	A.70	May, Jul 64	9,10,69,70
	TK.2500	May, Jul 64	9,69
	C.316	Jul 64	69
	N.411	Before 1 Jun 65	13
	Y.65	1 Jun 65	13

^aNearly all sources agree.

^bUnknown.

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<p>As late as mid-1965 Viet Cong control of the area within a 30-mile radius of Saigon was vested in the Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone Committee, which operates through a Standing Group and several staff sections with the chain of command leading to committees of similar structure at the lower administrative levels. This paper deals with Viet Cong control in the fields of military affairs, propaganda, Communist Party organization security and intelligence, courier and liaison services, and financial and economic survival.</p> <p>Data used in this study are derived almost exclusively from Viet Cong sources available in the files of the American intelligence community. A comprehensive analysis of the subject would require access to data from Vietnamese and third-country files.</p>		

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